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MISCHIEF WITH MALICE: A REVIEW OF LIABILITY 
FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND THE INSURED'S 
RIGHT TO INDEMNITY AGAINST 
AN EXEMPLARY AWARD 
Mark C. Treanort 
This Article begins with an examination of the law of 
punitive damages, both in Maryland and in other jurisdic-
tions. The author then discusses the question of whether an 
insured has a right to indemnity against a punitive award, 
focusing on the issues of insurance policy construction and 
public policy. A detailed analysis of a recent Maryland 
opinion on the subject is undertaken, and the author 
concludes with several recommendations for the Maryland 
judiciary and the legislature. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In First National Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit 
Companyl the Court of Appeals of Maryland specifically held2 that 
public policy did not protect the Fidelity & Deposit Company of 
Maryland from liability under the policy of insurance it had issued 
to the First National Bank of St. Mary's for that portion of a 
judgment entered against the Bank assessing exemplary damages. 3 
Addressing the issue of insurance coverage for exemplary damages 
for the first time,4 the court appears implicitly to have sanctioned the 
greatest departure to date from the previously espoused rationale for 
awarding punitive damages in Maryland, while explicitly altering 
the relationship between an insured and its insurer in terms of 
coverage provided and the premium rates charged for that coverage.5 
This Article examines the new law concerning insurance 
coverage for punitive damages in Maryland in light of prior 
t B.S., 1968, United States Naval Academy; J.D., 1976, University of Maryland 
School of Law; Associate, Miles & Stockbridge, Baltimore, Maryland. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Thomas S. Spencer, 
Articles Editor, University of Baltimore Law Review, and Kevin G. Quinn, law 
clerk, Miles & Stockbridge. 
1. 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359 (1978) [hereinafter sometimes referred to as the F & D 
case]. 
2. The majority opinion was written by Judge Smith. Joining him were Chief Judge 
Murphy and Judges Eldridge, Orth, Cole, and Liss (specially assigned). Judge 
Levine filed a dissenting opinion, 283 Md. at 243,389 A.2d at 367. It is interesting 
to note that Judge Levine previously had written almost all of the court's 
majority opinions in cases dealing with punitive damages since 1972. 
3. 283 Md. at 243, 389 A.2d at 367. 
4. The issue has been addressed previously by a number of other jurisdictions, and 
there is a definite split of opinion on the subject. See text accompanying note 55 
infra. 
5. See text accompanying notes 139-74 infra. 
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Maryland decisions dealing with punitive damages issues and with 
regard to the case law in other jurisdictions that have addressed the 
subject. In doing so an attempt is made to draw attention to 
questions left, unresolved by the court's decision in the F & D case 
and to suggest areas in which further judicial or legislative guidance 
is needed. 
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN MARYLAND 
A. The Rationale Behind Punitive Awards 
A variety of rationales have been expressed as justification for 
the award of punitive damages. The courts allowing "punitive" or 
"exemplary" damages are generally in agreement - though 
individual courts' expressions of the rationale may differ slightly -
that such damages are levied against a wrongdoer as a means of 
punishment because of his particularly aggravated misconduct and 
as a deterrent to others, warning them that similar conduct on their 
part will be dealt with harshly.6 
A few courts stray from this punishment/deterrent rationale, 
asserting that punitive damages may be viewed in a limited sense as 
compensatory. In that sense they are allowed as compensation for a 
plaintiffs wounded feelings as a roundabout means of compensation 
for the infliction of mental distress. 7 A third theory asserted by a few 
courts - and probably an underlying unspoken feeling of most - is 
what might be termed the "private attorney general" rationale. 
Courts ascribing to this theory assert that punitive damages should 
be allowed on the supposition that civil prosecution of persons guilty 
of aggravated misconduct is desirable, and the award of punitive 
damages is a necessary encouragement to potential litigants who, 
perhaps because of the likelihood of receiving only a small 
compensatory damages award, would not otherwise sue.S 
In Maryland it is well settled that a plaintiff may in the proper 
case9 be awarded punitive damages. Though an undercurrent 
6. See W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 9 (4th ed. 1971)[hereinafter cited as 
PROSSER]; D. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES §3.9 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DOBBS]; 
22 AM. JUR.2d Damages §§ 236, 237 (1965); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 117(1) (1966); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (Tent. Draft, 1973). 
7. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 9; DOBBS, supra note 6, at 204-05. 
8. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 10; DOBBS, supra note 6, at 205. 
9. In Maryland, punitive damages are allowable in most actions sounding in tort. 
See, e.g., Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976) (fraud); 
Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972) (negligent 
entrustment); Summit Loans, Inc. v. Pecola, 265 Md. 43, 288 A.2d 114 (1972) 
(invasion of privacy); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Brooks, 264 Md. 578, 2&7 A.2d 251 
(1972) (false imprisonment); Drug Fair of Md., Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 
A.2d 392 (1971) (assault, battery, false imprisonment); Associate Discount Corp. 
v. Hillary, 262 Md. 570, 278 A.2d 592 (1971) (trespass); American Stores v. Byrd, 
229 Md. 5, 181 A.2d 333 (1962) (defamation). Punitive· damages may not be 
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encompassing all of the above-discussed theories may be found in 
the Maryland cases, the continuously expressed rationale behind the 
award had been the need to punish the offender for his grievous 
wrong, and in doing so, to set an example for others.!O 
B. The Malice Requirement 
Evaluation of the feasibility of bringing or defending a punitive 
damages case necessarily begins with an assessment of the most 
awarded, however, in a pure contract action, i.e. an action for breach brought by 
one party against the other. See, e.g., Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 
309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972). On the other hand, they may be awarded for a cause of 
action that has arisen out of a contractual relationship, such as the tort of 
interference with contract. See Henderson v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 278 Md. 514, 
366 A.2d 1 (1976); H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975); 
Daugherty v. Kessler, 264 Md. 281, 286 A.2d 95 (1972); Damazo v. Wahby, 259 
Md. 627, 270 A.2d 814 (1970); Rinaldi v. Tana, 252 Md. 544, 250 A.2d 533 (1969); 
McClung-Logan Equip. Co. v. Thomas, 226 Md. 136, 172 A.2d 494 (1961). 
Plaintiffs seeking punitive damages must bring their actions in a court of 
law; a court of equity lacks the power to grant punitive awards, even if the facts 
of a given case would justify their imposition at law. See, e.g., Superior Constr. 
Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. 1, 104 A.2d 581, 48 A.L.R.2d 932 (1954) (an extensive review 
of Maryland's and other jurisdictions' rulings on the issue). Although by bring-
ing an action in equity a plaintiff waives his claim to punitive damages, there 
appears to be a gray area in equity - perhaps analogous to the ephemeral basis 
of recovery for pain and suffering - in which, when determining the amount of 
compensatory damages to be awarded, the chancellor may take into considera-
tion the motive of the wrongdoer. The tort-feasor's bad motive then may be 
reflected in the increased assessment of compensatory damages without actually 
acknowledging that such an increase is the equivalent of a punitive award. Id. 
As a practical matter, when seeking both compensatory and punitive 
damages combined with a plea for equitable relief, as in a cause of action for 
libel, one may avoid forfeiting a claim to an exemplary award by bringing an 
action at law for damages and seeking an injunction at law as ancillary relief 
under MD. RULES BF 40-43. See Prucha v. Weiss, 233 Md. 479, 197 A.2d 253, cert. 
denied, 377 U.S. 992 (1964). 
Actions based wholly or in part upon statutory rights present different 
problems. Survival actions and actions for wrongful death are examples and 
must be clearly distinguished. Punitive damages are not recoverable in a 
wrongful death action brought under MD. CTS. & JUD. PRO. CODE ANN. § 3-904 
(Supp. 1978) because the rights of the plaintiff are created by statute, and the 
recoverable damages are specifically limited thereby. Smith v. Gray Concrete 
Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972). Survival actions, however, brought by 
the administrator of the decedent's estate under MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. 
§ 7-401 (1974), are not predicated upon a new cause of action created by statute, 
as are wrongful death actions. The plaintiffs claim in a survival action is one 
the decedent could have maintained himself had he lived to do so. Hence, even 
though not expressly authorized by statute, a personal representative may 
recover punitive damages in any case where they might have been awarded to 
the decedent had the latter survived the defendant's wrongful act. Smith v. Gray 
Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972). 
10. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16 (1977); Gaither 
v. Blowers, 11 Md. 536 (1857); cf. Pratt v. Ayler, 4 H. & J. 349 (Md. 1817) (criminal 
intentions in civil assault and battery case may be considered by jury in 
awarding damages). In light of the F & D decision, however, the validity of the 
warning rationale may now be open to some question. See text accompanying 
notes 139-74 infra. 
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critical point of such a case - the likelihood of establishing that the 
defendant acted with "malice" as that term is construed by the 
courts of Maryland. The determination of whether the defendant 
acted with malice is the crucial issue in an action for punitive 
damages, for without such a finding no case can be established for 
an exemplary award. 
The question "What is malice?" cannot be answered directly for 
in reality it appears to be whatever conduct by the defendant is so 
offensive that the court or jury believes him to be worthy of 
punishment. At one extreme might be the case where a defendant 
has clearly acted in a spirit of outright hatred toward the plaintiff, 
leaving little doubt that his wicked acts are deserving of the jury's, 
or perhaps ultimately the Court of Appeals', wrath. The threshold at 
the other end of the spectrum over which a defendant must have 
stepped to be found deserving of punishment is not as easily 
recognized. 
The basic criteria by which to judge a defendant on the punitive 
damages issue was stated in the oft-cited 1884 case of Philadelphia, 
Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Co. v. Hoeflich. ll In reversing the 
lower court's assessment of punitive damages against a conductor 
who had wrongfully and forcibly ejected a passenger from a train, 
the Court of Appeals enunciated guidelines that have purportedly 
controlled the court decisions in Maryland punitive damages cases 
for the better part of a century: 
The force and deliberation with which the wrongful act 
is done, are not necessarily the tests by which the question 
of punitive damages is to be determined. On the contrary, to 
entitle one to such damages there must be an element of 
fraud, or malice, or evil intent, or oppression entering into 
and forming part of the wrongful act. 
. . . [T]o entitle the plaintiff to recover punitive damages 
. the jury must find that the wrongful act was done 
wantonly, or wilfully, or in the spirit of oppression. It is the 
evil motive or intention with which the wrongful act is done 
... on which rests the rule of punitive damages. l2 
The Hoeflich holding was translated by the court into a two-part 
rule for evaluating defendant's conduct. One part demanded a 
finding of an actual, real, evil motive. The alternative second part 
tempered the first by equating malice with a recklessness, closely 
bordering on the intentional disregard of plaintiffs rights. 
Hence in Heinze v. Murphy,l3 the court stated that, 
11. 62 Md. 300 (1884). 
12. ld. at 307, 309. 
13. 180 Md. 423, 24 A.2d 917 (1942). 
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A wrong motive must accompany the wrongful act, and 
without proof of malice or some other aggravation, exem-
plary damages cannot be recovered.14 
The terms "malice" and "wanton" were defined in stark, sharp 
terms in Dennis v. Baltimore Transit CO.:15 
The word 'malice', as used in the rule for imposition of 
punitive damages, signifies that the defendant was influ-
enced by hatred and spite and that he indulged in deliberate 
and wilful mischief to injure that plaintiff. 
The word 'wanton' means characterized by extreme 
recklessness and utter disregard for the rights of others.16 
Following those definitions the court pronounced the test to be 
used in evaluating defendant's conduct: 
We specifically hold that, in a suit for [punitive· 
damages] ... it must be shown by the plaintiff in order to 
recover punitive damages that the [defendant] not only 
acted wrongfully but without just cause or excuse, and with 
the evil motive to injure or oppress, or at least with a 
reckless disregard of the rights of the person injured.17 
Entangled in the court's pronouncements about the meaning of 
malicious or wanton conduct has been the semantic battle over 
distinctions between "actual" malice and "implied" malice. At first 
glance one might conclude that the court was demanding proof of a 
visceral, gut-felt hatred underlying defendant's conduct. Indeed in 
1971 the Court of Appeals stated in Drug Fair of Maryland v. 
Smith,ls 
Actual or express malice may be characterized as the 
performance of an unlawful act, intentionally or wantonly, 
without legal justification or excuse but with an evil or 
rancorous motive influenced by hate: the purpose being to 
deliberately and willfully injure the plaintiff.19 
Strong language that! But that language is subject to tempering 
by the notion that besides an actual loathesome hating, which is 
clearly "actual" malice, there is a "legal equivalent" of that hatred 
14. Id. at 429, 24 A.2d at 921. 
15. 189 Md. 610, 56 A.2d 813 (1948). 
16. Id. at 616-17,56 A.2d at 817. 
17. Id. at 617, 56 A.2d at 817. 
18. 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (1971). 
19. Id. at 352, 283 A.2d at 398. 
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which, if established by plaintiff, may entitle him to recover 
punitive damages in certain cases.20 That legal equivalent of malice 
has been characterized as an action by defendant "accompanied by 
. fraud, ill will, recklessness, wantonness, oppressiveness, willful 
disregard of the plaintiffs rights, or other circumstances tending to 
aggravate the injury."21 Until recent years, however, it was not clear 
whether a plaintiff, in any given case, was required to prove actual 
malice or only to meet the somewhat less onerous burden of 
establishing its legal equivalent of implied malice.22 
In a series of cases beginning in 1975, the Court of Appeals set 
forth guidelines to be followed in making that determination. In H & 
R Block, Inc. v. Testerman,23 the plaintiffs had sued in both tort and 
contract alleging that H & R Block had "negligently, wantonly, 
maliciously and intentionally" prepared their income tax returns 
incorrectly.24 Labeling the plaintiffs' claim as one for "a negligent 
breach of contract,"25 the court held that where the tort for which a 
punitive damages recovery is sought is one that arises out of a 
contractual relationship, actual malice as described above is a 
prerequisite to the recovery of punitive damages.26 Though in later 
20. See, e.g., Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972); St. 
Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturer's Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12, 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971); Vancherie v. Siperly, 243 Md. 366, 221 A.2d 356 
(1966); Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 24 A.2d 917 (1942). 
21. McClung·Logan Equip. Co. v. Thomas, 226 Md. 136, 148, 172 A.2d 494, 500 (1961). 
22. See generally McCadden, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases in Maryland, 6 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 203 (1977). 
23. 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975). 
24. Id. at 37-38, 338 A.2d at 49. 
25. Id. at 48, 338 A.2d at 55. 
26. Id. at 47, 338 A.2d at 54. In so holding, the court cited a number of prior cases, 
which it said foreshadowed the rule stated in Testerman. See Siegman v. 
Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972); Daugherty v. Kessler, 264 
Md. 281, 286 A.2d 95 (1972); St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturer's Life Ins. 
Co., 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971); Damazo v. 
Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 270 A.2d 814 (1970); Knickerbocker Co. v. Gardiner Co., 107 
Md. 556, 69 A. 405 (1908). 
The court also distinguished Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 
297 A.2d 721 (1972), the only case in which the Court of Appeals has held that 
punitive damages could be recovered for an automobile tort. In Gray, the 
majority, over Judge Smith's strong dissenting view that the court was usurping 
legislative prerogatives, departed from the stark strictness of Hoeflich by 
formulating a test based largely upon the theories found in cases dealing with 
the crime of manslaughter by motor vehicle: 
We regard a "wanton or reckless disregard for human life" in the 
operation of a motor vehicle, with the known dangers and risks 
attendant to such conduct, as the legal equivalent of malice. It is a 
standard which, although stopping just short of willful or intentional 
injury, contemplates conduct which is of an extraordinary or outrageous 
character. 
267 Md. at 168, 297 A.2d at 731. The court in H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 
Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975), later indicated that the Gray holding "is confined to a 
wanton or reckless disregard for human life and the operation of a motor 
vehicle." Id. at 47, 338 A.2d at 54 (emphasis in original). 
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opinions27 the court drew the distinction between pure tort cases and 
cases in which the tort arose from a contractual relationship, the 
first detailed explanation of the distinction drawn by the court 
between pure tort and tort arising out of contract causes of action 
came in General Motors Corp. v. Piskor.28 Describing the latter type 
of case, the court observed that 
[a] common thread runs through all these cases. In each 
instance, the tortious conduct and the contract were so 
intertwined that one could not be viewed in isolation from 
the other. Indeed, a conspicuous number of the cases in 
which the actual malice rule has been applied concern 
tortious inducement to breach a contract. In still others, the 
tort consisted of nothing more than an allegedly negligent 
performance of contract obligations, to the extent that the 
tort action was accompanied by a separate cause of action 
sounding in contract. In one form or another, then, the tort 
arose directly from performance or breach of contract. 29 
The court distinguished cases that had involved only tangential 
contractual relationships. It noted that the torts for which punitive 
damages had been sought in those cases could not have been found 
to have arisen out of the contractual relationship because there was 
no direct connection between the contract and the tort in question.30 
The court's holding relied upon this distinction: 
In order, then, for an alleged wrong to constitute a "tort 
arising out of a contractual relationship," thereby necessi-
tating proof of common law actual malice to permit recovery 
of punitive damages, we require that there be a direct nexus 
between the tortious act and performance or breach of the 
terms and conditions of the parties' underlying contract.31 
It is now clear, therefore, that when considering the possibility 
of the jury's awarding punitive damages and evaluating the malice 
requirement in the case, the parties must not only draw a distinction 
27. See, e.g., Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976); 
Henderson v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 278 Md. 514, 366 A.2d 1 (1976); Food Fair 
Stores v. Hevey, 275 Md. 50, 338 A.2d 43 (1975). 
28. 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16 (1977). 
29. Id. at 637, 381 A.2d at 2l. 
30. Id. at 637-38, 381 A.2d at 22 (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans, 275 
Md. 441, 340 A.2d 705 (1975); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cliser, 267 Md. 406, 298 
A.2d 16 (1972); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Brooks, 264 Md. 578, 287 A.2d 251 (1972); 
Vancherie v. Siperly, 243 Md. 366, 221 A.2d 356 (1966); Dennis v. Baltimore 
Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 56 A.2d 813 (1948». 
31. General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 640, 381 A.2d 16, 23 (1977). 
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between tort and contract causes of action,32 but must also closely 
examine the type of tort and the relationship between the parties 
from which the cause of action arises. 
c. Proof of Malice 
It has long been recognized that malice, fraud, deceit, and 
wrongful motive are seldom admitted and most often must be 
inferred from acts and circumstantial evidence, and need not be 
proved by direct evidence.33 Hence the trier of fact may draw an 
inference of malice or its legal equivalent from both direct and 
circumstantial evidence. To entitle a plaintiff to a punitive recovery, 
malice usually must be proved as a distinct matter different from the 
basic elements of the tort at issue. In the case of malicious 
prosecution, however, punitive damages may always be awarded 
whenever the defendant is held liable for the tort itself.34 The malice 
that constitutes one element of the tort is sufficient to support a 
punitive award.35 
D. Imputing Malice 
As well as being inferred from the facts of a case, malice may 
also be imputed from the circumstances surrounding defendant's 
acts. If punitive damages are not recoverable against one's agent, 
they may not be assessed on the basis of the agency relationship 
against the principal himself.36 If, however, the agent is found to 
have acted with malice, that malice may be attributable to the 
principal if the agent's conduct was within the scope of his 
employment.37 In order to impute the agent's malice to the principal, 
there is no need for affirmative proof that the employer authorized, 
participated in, or ratified the tortious act of his employee, as long as 
the latter was acting in furtherance of his master's business.38 
Furthermore, the defendant employer generally has the burden of 
32. The Piskor court reiterated the rationale behind the rule that punitive damages 
could not be awarded in actions for breach of contract. See 281 Md. at 638-39, 
381 A.2d at 22. 
33. McClung·Logan Equip. Co. v. Thomas, 226 Md. 136, 172 A.2d 494 (1961); Geisey 
v. Holberg, 185 Md. 642, 653, 45 A.2d 735, 740 (1946). 
34. See, e.g., American Stores v. Byrd, 229 Md. 5, 181 A.2d 333 (1962); Newton v. 
Spence, 20 Md. App. 126, 316 A.2d 837 (1974). 
35. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 
389 A.2d 359 (1978); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cliser, 267 Md. 406, 298 A.2d 16 
(1972); American Stores v. Byrd, 229 Md. 5, 181 A.2d 333 (1962). 
36. Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972). 
37. Freeman Assocs., Inc. v. Murray, 18 Md. App. 419, 306 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 269 
Md. 756 (1973). 
38. Drug Fair of Md., Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (1971); Freeman 
Assocs., Inc. v. Murray, 18 Md. App. 419, 306 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 269 Md. 756 
(1973). 
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proving to the jury that the defendant employee was not engaged in 
the course of his employment when the act was performed.39 That 
burden of proof is not one that is readily met. 
Significantly, the question of the master's liability does not turn 
on the quality of the act performed or the method by which that act 
is accomplished. Punitive liability instead turns simply upon a 
determination of whether the servant performed the act in the line of 
duty and within. the scope of authority conferred upon him by the 
master.40 Only if the jury finds that the employee's acts were 
motivated solely and exclusively by some personal motive unrelated 
to his position as an employee, will the employer escape liability.41 
Hence, although the servant's mode of action may exceed all 
reasonable bounds that a rational employer would expect him to use 
in his duties, if the tortious act occurred in the performance of those 
duties, punitive damages may be assessed against the master.42 
E. Other Jury Considerations 
The existence or nonexistence of malice is a question of fact to be 
determined by the jury, although the trial judge may not allow the 
jury to speculate that there were sufficient grounds for an award of 
punitive damages when in reality there were none.43 Many other 
factors besides the definition of malicious conduct must, of course, 
also be considered. Given the right set of facts, a defendant has the 
right to have the judge instruct the jury that it should take into 
consideration the provocative acts and words of the plaintiff in 
mitigation of the punitive damages it might assess against the 
defendant.44 Similarly, in those cases where probable cause has been 
a factor in defendant's actions, such as false arrest, the existence of 
probable cause, while not necessarily a defense to the act, may be 
shown in mitigation of punitive damages.45 
39. Newton v. Spence, 20 Md. App. 126,316 A.2d 837, cert. denied, 271 Md. 741 (1974). 
40. See, e.g., Drug Fair of Md., Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (1971); 
Freeman Assocs., Inc. v. Murray, 18 Md. App. 419, 306 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 269 
Md. 756 (1973); ct. Dennis v. Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 56 A.2d 813 
(1948) (street car conductor maliciously ordered arrest of passenger while 
transacting the carrier's business). 
41. Newton v. Spence, 20 Md. App. 126,316 A.2d 837, cert. denied, 271 Md. 741 (1974). 
42. Boyer & Co. v. Coxen, 92 Md. 366, 48 A. 161 (1901) (a vivid example of the 
proposition - the employee had viciously beaten a salesman with a monkey 
wrench). See also cases cited at notes 74-80 infra. 
43. Baltimore Transit Co. v. Faulkner, 179 Md. 598, 20 A.2d 485 (1941). 
44. Vancherie v. Siperly, 243 Md. 366, 221 A.2d 356 (1966); Feinberg v. George 
Washington Cemetery, 226 Md. 393, 174 A.2d 72 (1961); Dennis v. Baltimore 
Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 56 A.2d 813 (1948); Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 24 
A.2d 917 (1942). 
45. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643,261 A.2d 731 (1970); Clark's Park 
v. Hranicka, 246 Md. 178, 227 A.2d 726 (1967); Fleisher v. Ensminger, 140 Md. 
604, 118 A. 153 (1922). 
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The award of a punitive damages recovery is not a matter of 
right. Although punitive damages are purportedly awarded on public 
policy grounds as a punishment for, and as a deterrent against, 
malicious conduct, they are not meant to compensate plaintiff for his 
loss, and generally there can be no award of exemplary damages in 
favor of one who has proved no actual compensable loss.46 
If the jury does determine that the defendant acted with malice 
and that compensatory damages should be awarded, it may also 
award such an amount of exemplary damages as the jurors in their 
discretion see fit upon consideration of all of the attendant 
circumstances of the case.47 
In Maryland, unlike several other jurisdictions, there is no 
requirement that there be some ratio established between the 
compensatory award and the amount ofthe punitive damages.48 The 
jury's discretion should not be unlimited, utterly arbitrary, or be 
exercised with passion, prejudice, or bias,49 and may be subject to the 
trial court's order of remittitur. 50 Upon appeal, however, the court 
generally will not disturb the trial judge's discretion in denying a 
46. Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 265 Md. 631, 291 A.2d 64 (1972); B. & B. Refrigeration & 
Air Conditioning Servo Co., Inc. v. Stander, 263 Md. 577,284 A.2d 244 (1971). See 
also Wolf v. Levitt & Sons, 267 Md. 623, 298 A.2d 374 (1972); Delisi v. Garnett, 
257 Md. 4, 261 A.2d 784 (1970). In the realm of punitive damages the requirement 
that a plaintiff establish the existence of such harm translates into the necessity 
for proof, and recovery, of compensatory damages. While every technical 
invasion of one's legal rights may give rise to a cause of action for the recovery 
of nominal damages (generally a trivial sum such as one cent or one dollar), it is 
clear that in Maryland recovery of merely technical nominal damages will not, 
in all but a few special cases, afford a basis for recovery of punitive damages. 
The exceptions to this requirement of a substratum award of actual compensato-
ry damages appear to be actions involving the torts of malicious prosecution and 
cases of slander or defamation. See, e.g., Nance v. Gall, 187 Md. 656, 50 A.2d 120 
(1946), modified, 187 Md. 656, 51 A.2d 535 (1947); Newton v. Spence, 20 Md. App. 
126, 316 A.2d 837, cert. denied, 271 Md. 741 (1974). 
The relationship between compensatory and punitive awards presents 
another potential problem in those actions involving a remittitur. Following a 
jury award of both compensatory and punitive damages, the trial judge may 
grant a judgment n.o.v. on the punitive damages issue and also grant 
defendant's motion for a new trial on the compensatory damages issue unless 
plaintiff agrees to a remittitur of part of the compensatory damages. If plaintiff 
accepts the remittitur, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal on 
the punitive damages issue. Kneas v. Hecht Co., 257 Md. 121,262 A.2d 518 (1970); 
Turner v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 221 Md. 494, 158 A.2d 125 
(1960). 
47. Galusca v. Dodd, 189 Md. 666, 57 A.2d 313 (1948); Dennis v. Baltimore Transit 
Co., 189 Md. 610, 56 A.2d 813 (1948); Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 24 A.2d 917 
(1942). 
48. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Brooks, 264 Md. 578, 287 A.2d 251 (1972). 
49. See 8 M.L.E. Damages § 113 (1960); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 126(1) (1966). 
50. See Kneas v. Hecht Co., 257 Md. 121, 262 A.2d 518 (1970); Turner v. Washington 
Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 221 Md. 494, 158 A.2d 125 (1960). 
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new trial because of the inadequacy or insufficiency of the award or 
overturn the verdict because of its size.51 
Because punitive damages should be assessed in an amount that 
will punish the malicious defendant, there is no set formula by 
which the jury may calculate the proper amount of the exemplary 
award. As closely as possible the punishment should be made to fit 
not only the enormity of the act but also the particular circumstan-
ces of the actor. 
Damages which may constitute proper punishment or 
provide a sufficient deterrent in the case of a defendant of 
modest means may not serve those purposes so far as a more 
affluent defendant is concerned. Conversely a verdict that 
would scarcely be regarded by a wealthy man, might be 
ruinous to a poor man.52 
In order to assist the jury in arriving at a determination of the 
amount of punitive damages to be assessed, the plaintiff has been 
permitted to introduce evidence of defendant's financial worth.53 In 
the same light it seems that an impecunious defendant should be 
able to introduce evidence of his financial status in an attempt to 
lessen the amount of exemplary damages that the jury may assess 
against him. 54 
III. INSURANCE COVERAGE 
Traditionally, the Maryland courts have sanctioned the imposi-
tion of a punitive assessment only against those defendants who 
had acted with "malice" toward the persons whom they had 
51. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Brooks, 264 Md. 578, 287 A.2d 251 (1972); Freeman 
Assocs., Inc. v. Murray, 18 Md. App. 419, 427-28, 306 A.2d 548, 554, cert. denied, 
269 Md. 756 (1973) (citing Bell v. Morrison, 27 Miss. 68, 86 (1854». 
Cases involving multiple torts, however, present a particular problem for the 
calculation of a punitive award. In such actions it is incumbent upon the trial 
judge to instruct the jury that even though plaintiffs claim may be stated in 
separate counts, it must determine whether the alleged facts occurred in actuality 
in one continuous transaction. If so, the plaintiff will not be allowed to pyramid 
his punitive damages into several different awards, but may receive only one 
award based upon defendant's malicious actions considering the transactions as 
a whole. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cliser, 267 Md. 406, 298 A.2d 16 (1972); Drug 
Fair of Md., Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (197l); Newton v. Spence, 20 
Md. App. 126, 316 A.2d 837, cert. denied, 27l Md. 741 (1974). 
52. Freeman Assocs., Inc. v. Murray, 18 Md. App. 419, 306 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 269 
Md. 756 (1973). 
53. Jd.; Fennell v. G.A.C. Fin. Corp., 242 Md. 209, 218 A.2d 492 (1966). The decision in 
First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 
359 (1978), however, has placed the use of this procedure in considerable doubt. 
See text accompanying notes 139-74 infra. 
54. Cf. Nance v. Gall, 187 Md. 656, 50 A.2d 120 (1946), modified, 51 A.2d 535 (1947) 
(evidence as to defendant's financial responsibility could have been offered to the 
jury, although none was introduced). 
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damaged. Further, the courts have determined that that award 
should be granted in such an amount as would provide for deterrence 
and punishment in light of each individual case's circumstances of 
wrongdoing and the defendant's financial condition. Prior to the F & 
D case, however, no appellate level decision in Maryland had 
addressed the question of whether a wrongdoer who had been found 
to have acted with malice and had therefore had an exemplary 
award assessed against him could be indemnified by his insurer for 
such punitive damages. 
A. Other Jurisdictions 
The question of whether an insurance company must indemnify 
its insured against a punitive damages award assessed against it 
has been addressed by less than one-half of the jurisdictions in this 
county. Most of those cases deal with motor vehicle torts and 
therefore interpret automobile liability insurance policies. The 
reported decisions show a definite split among the authorities. 55 
Determination of the issue of whether an insurance company 
must indemnify its insured against punitive damages assessed 
against him requires a two-fold analysis. The first question to be 
decided is whether the language of the applicable insurance policy 
55. Cases holding against insurance coverage for punitive damages include Ohio 
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 
734 (1935) (applying Missouri law); Gleason v. Fryer, 30 Colo. 106, 491 P.2d 85 
(1971); Brown v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); 
Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934); Sterling Ins. 
Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 194 So. 2d 622 
(1964); Nicholson v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1965); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Padavan v. 
Clemente, 43 A.D.2d 729, 350 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1973); Teska v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. 
Co., 59 Misc. 2d 615, 300 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1969). 
Cases that have permitted insurance coverage for punitive damages include 
Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thorton, 244 F.2d 
823 (4th Cir. 1957) (applying South Carolina law); General Cas. Co. of America v. 
Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956) (applying Tennessee law); Fagot v. 
Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. La. 1978) (applying Louisiana law); Norfolk v. 
Western Ry. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 420 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ind. 
1976) (applying Indiana law); Concord General Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills, 345 F. 
Supp. 1090 (D. Me. 1972) (applying Maine law); United States Fidelity & Guar. 
Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943) (applying California law); Capital 
Motor Lines v. Loring, 238 Ala. 260, 189 So. 897 (1939); Employers Ins. Co. of Ala. 
v. Brock, 233 Ala. 551, 172 So. 671 (1937); American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Werfel, 
230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103, aff'd, 231 Ala. 285, 164 So. 383 (1935); Maryland Cas. 
Co. v. Baker, 304 Ky. 296, 200 S.W.2d 757 (Ct. App. 1947); Cavin's, Inc. v. Atlantic 
Mut. Ins. Co., 27 N.C. App. 698, 220 S.E.2d 403 (1975); Carroway v. Johnson, 245 
S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 
S.W.2d 341 (Tex. App. 1972). See cases cited at note 144 infra. See generally 
Anderson, Indemnity Against Punitive Damages, 27 Sw. L.J. 593 (1973) 
[hereinafter ANDERSON]; STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY IN PERSONAL INJURY 
AND DEATH ACTIONS § 201 (1972) [hereinafter STEIN]; Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 343 
(1968). 
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should be construed to provide for indemnity against such damages. 
An affirmative answer to that question requires consideration of a 
second: Would such indemnity against exemplary damages violate 
the public policy of the jurisdiction? Courts addressing the problem 
have differed in their approaches, some discussing only one or the 
other of these questions, others discussing both. 
B. Insurance Policy Construction 
The courts that have addressed the construction issue have often 
differed on their interpretations of essentially the same policy 
language. Further, although some cases have held against indemni-
ty on the basis of construction of the language of the insurance 
policy involved, most indicate, explicity or implicitly, that the court's 
decision was based in part on public policy considerations also.56 
Courts construing policies in such a way as to deny coverage for 
punitive damages have found that language providing for indemnity 
against damages assessed "because of bodily injury" or "because of 
property damage" precluded exemplary damages because exemplary 
damages are assessed as punishment for a defendant's wrongful 
acts and as a deterrent to others, not "because of' bodily injury. 
Hence, in Universal Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Tenery,57 an auto 
negligence case, the court stated that, 
. . . the policy indemnifies against damages for bodily 
injuries, and nothing in addition is contracted for, and there 
is no further' liability. The injured will not be allowed to 
collect from a non-participating party, for a wrong against 
the public.58 
56. Cases that have held against indemnity on the basis of construction of the 
insurance policy language include Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 
18 A.2d 357 (1941); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); LoRocco v. 
New Jersey Manufacturer's Indem. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323, 197 A.2d 591, cert. 
denied, 42 N.J. 144, 199 A.2d 65~ (1964). 
Cases that have refused indemnity on the basis of public policy considera-
tions include Surety Co. of New York v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966); 
Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962); Ohio Cas. 
Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co. 75 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 
(1935); Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 16 Ariz. App. 514, 494 P.2d 711 
(1972); Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934); 
Brown v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Nicholson 
v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); 
Padavan v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 43 A.D.2d 729, 350 N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div. 
1973); Teska v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 59 Misc. 2d 615, 300 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Dist. Ct. 
1969); Cavin's, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 27 N.C. App. 698, 220 S.E.2d 403 
(1975); Edmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966). 
57. 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934). 
58. Id. at 17, 39 P.2d at 779. See also Gleason v. Fryer, 30 Colo. 106, 491 P.2d 85 
(1971); Brown v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); 
Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941) (statutory 
multiple damages for injuries resulting from willful violation of traffic 
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Other courts faced with similar language have not found it a 
barrier to indemnity. Construing such standard language as "to pay 
on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become 
legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injuries," 
courts holding in favor of punitive coverage have often focused on 
the term "all sums" and found the provisions broad enough to 
warrant recovery. 59 Courts construing such language in favor of 
coverage for punitive assessments have stressed that the voluntary 
contracts in question did not specifically exclude punitive damages, 
were free of ambiguity, and hence could be construed against the 
insurer.60 
C. Public Policy Considerations 
The courts that have approached the issue of whether punitive 
damages may be covered by insurance from the point of view of 
public policy considerations have split in their opinions of the 
validity of indemnification for damages that are allegedly imposed 
for punishment and deterrence. The oft-cited opinion of the Fifth 
regulations; held that policy language should be construed narrowly in light of 
public policy against indemnity for penalties imposed because of a public wrong); 
Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964). 
59. See, e.g., General Cas. Co. of America v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956) 
(reliance solely upon construction of policy language obligating the insurer "to 
pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become obligated 
to pay by reason of the liability ... imposed upon him by law ... for damages 
... sustained ... by any person ... "); Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills, 345 
F. Supp. 1090 (D. Me. 1972); Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United 
States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); Lazenby v. Universal 
Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964). See also Carroway v. 
Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965), where the court relied upon 
construction of the policy provision "To pay on behalf of the insured all sums 
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of: 
A. bodily injury ... sustained by any person ... arising out of the ... use of 
the owned automobile, or any non-owned automobile .... " The court then 
determined that the obligation to pay "all sums" that the insured was legally 
obligated to pay as damages included punitive damages. It further resolved that 
punitive damages are also "damages because of bodily injury," stating that the 
average insured would expect that the policy afforded coverage of all claims for 
any kind of damages arising out of his use of his automobile. Id. at 204, 139 
S.E.2d at 909 (citing T.J. ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4312 at 
132-33 (1962». Accord, Fagot v. Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. La. 1978) (policy 
held to provide indemnity against punitive liability of policemen for violation of 
plaintiffs civil rights); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 
420 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ind. 1976); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3 
F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Danill, 246 
Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969). 
60. See, e.g., Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, 232 
S.E.2d 910 (1977) (finding no specific exclusion of punitive damages but noting 
the exclusion for criminal acts in a unique cemetery liability policy); Abbie 
Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 
P.2d 783 (1973); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199,567 P.2d 1013 (1977); 
Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965). 
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Circuit Court of Appeals in Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. 
McNulty61 is the leading decision holding against insurance 
coverage for punitive damages. The policy in question in McNulty 
was a family combination automobile policy issued to one Smith, a 
resident of Virginia. Smith, while intoxicated, was involved in a 
high speed, hit-and-run accident in Florida, which caused McNulty 
extreme injury, including permanent brain damage. A Florida court 
awarded both compensatory and punitive damages, and McNulty 
then brought an ancillary garnishment proceeding against the 
insurer in federal district court. The insurer appealed from the 
portion of the ensuing judgment allowing recovery of punitive 
damages under the insurance policy. The insurance company argued 
both that the language of the policy did not cover exemplary 
damages, and that, even if the policy construction would permit 
coverage, such coverage would violate public policy. The Fifth 
Circuit did not even consider the language construction issue; 
instead, it based its holding against coverage entirely upon public 
policy grounds. The court stated that the fundamental purposes of 
exemplary damages are punishment and· deterrence, and, therefore, 
the burden of paying such damages should rest upon the wrongdoer. 
The court noted that an attempt to shift the burden to insurance 
companies would result in increased insurance premiums and that 
society would, therefore, actually be punishing itself. Analogizing to 
criminal misconduct and the public policy against insurance 
against criminal fines, the court stated that the same public policy 
should invalidate contracts of insurance against "the civil punish-
ment that punitive damages represents" so that a person does not 
gain "a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment 
of sanctions against such misconduct."62 
The McNulty court found that three substantial practical 
difficulties weighed against allowing coverage for punitive damages. 
First, such coverage would produce a serious conflict of interest 
between the insurer and the insured in settlement negotiations and 
trial tactics.63 Second, there would be a conflict between the rule that 
the defendant's financial standing may be considered in assessing 
punitive damages and the rule against referring to the defendant's 
insurance in the presence of the jury. 64 Third, jury verdicts for small 
compensatory damages and gigantic punitive assessments could 
cause results having no relation to making the injured party whole 
and would therefore be justifiable only if the wrongdoer himself paid 
the amount assessed by the jury as punishment.65 
61. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962). 
62. Id. at 440. 
63. Id. at 441. 
64. Id. 
65.Id. 
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In reaching its holding, however, the majority laid greatest 
stress upon the fact that many people are maimed or killed in 
highway accidents and vehemently argued that depriving socially 
irresponsible drivers of insurance coverage for punitive damages 
would act as a deterrent to reckless driving. 66 
The leading case contrary to the McNulty rationale is Lazenby 
v. Universal Underwriters Insurance CO.67 In Lazenby, the Supreme 
Court of Tennessee first held that the policy language in question 
provided for indemnity against a punitive award.68 The Lazenby 
court then acknowledged that the primary purposes of punitive 
damages in Tennessee are punishment and deterrence and cited 
extensively from the McNulty decision. The court, however, declined 
to follow McNulty for several reasons. First, the court observed that 
even though highway accident deaths and injuries are a very serious 
problem, forbidding the payment of punitive damages through 
insurance would not necessarily accomplish the result of deterring 
drivers from their wrongful conduct.69 Second, the court found that 
the policy language had been construed by most courts at the time to 
cover punitive damages,70 and opined that the average policy holder 
reading the policy would believe he was protected against all claims 
not intentionally inflicted.71 Third, it was noted that there is often a 
fine line between simple negligence and the type of negligence upon 
which a punitive award can be made.72 The court concluded that to 
deny coverage of exemplary damages would result in a partial 
voiding of the contract between the insurance company and its 
insured, and, declaring that partial voiding of private contracts 
should not be done except in the clearest of cases, found no 
persuasive public policy reasons for denying insurance coverage for 
the punitive award. 73 
D. Vicarious Liability 
In cases in which an insured has been found only vicariously 
liable for its agent's wrongdoing, the courts have had little difficulty 
in allowing indemnity against a punitive award assessed against 
the insured. The proposition that public policy does not preclude 
indemnity against punitive damages that have been awarded on the 
66. Id. at 441-42. The concurring opinion was skeptical of the argument that 
depriving irresponsible drivers of insurance coverage would deter reckless 
driving. Id. at 444. 
67. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964). 
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basis of respondeat superior is generally designated by the 
commentators in terms such as "the strong majority view."74 Even 
those courts that would hold that indemnity for punitive damages 
generally is against public policy have often carefully distinguished 
situations dealing with such damages assessed against one whose 
only liability is vicarious.75 
Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Welfare Finance CO.,76 the 
leading case concerning a vicarious liability situation, is illustrative 
of the approach taken by the courts. In that case, arising in 
Missouri, the insured corporation had been found vicariously liable 
for its employee-truck driver's reckless and wanton act. The policy in 
question insured the corporation 
[a]gainst loss by reason of liability imposed by law upon the 
assured for damages on account of bodily injuries . . . 
accidentally sustained . . . by any person or persons, other 
than employees of the assured.77 
The court construed that language as follows: 
Since this policy clearly covers bodily damage through 
negligence and since these punitive damages are imposed 
because of the aggravated circumstances or form of this 
negligence, such punitive damages must be regarded as 
coming within the meaning of the policy. 78 
Addressing the public policy issue, the court noted that 
insurance against the consequences of intentional wrongdoing 
would probably be against public policy and implied that public 
74. See, e.g., STEIN, supra note 55, at § 201; ANDERSON, supra note 55, at 605. 
75. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 439-40 (5th Cir. 
1962) ("[A] factor not always focused upon, yet of crucial importance, is the point 
that if the employer did not participate in the wrong the policy of preventing the 
wrongdoer from escaping the penalties for his wrong is inapplicable."). In 
Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 194 
So. 2d 622 (1964), the court stated, 
[T]here is a distinction between the actual tort feasor and one only 
vicariously liable and that therefore public policy is not violated by 
construing a liability policy to include punitive damages recovered by an 
inj!lred person where the insured did not participate in or authorize the 
act. 
ld. at 900 (footnote omitted). In so holding, the Sterling court determined that the 
insurance policy term "accident" included the assault and battery since it was 
committed by the servant without the insured's consent. Although the policy 
insured against all damages "because of bodily injury," the court did not discuss 
that terminology. The court was not confronted with the question of whether the 
servant had been negligently hired. 
76. 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935) (applying Missouri 
law). 
77. ld. at 58. 
78. ld. at 59. 
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policy might also be contravened by indemnifying an actual - as 
opposed to a vicariously liable - wrongdoer against a punitive 
assessment. 79 Holding that the insurer must indemnify the vicar-
iously liable corporation against the punitive award, the court 
reasoned that where there was no direct or indirect participation on 
the part of the master in the commission of the act, no public policy 
would be violated by protecting the master from the unauthorized 
action of his servant: 
A different situation is present where the sole liability of the 
insured arises out of the relation of master and servant. If 
the master participates in, authorizes, or knows in advance 
that his servant will probably commit the unlawful injurious 
act, then the situation may be analogous to where the 
insured himself commits an intentional act with an intended 
injury and the same reasons for holding a protecting policy 
invalid as to such acts would exist. However, the court has 
here found that there was no evidence that the servant 
causing the injury here "had been instructed by plaintiff to 
act in a negligent, wanton, wrongful or unlawful manner 
towards [the injured], nor that the alleged negligence or 
wrongful acts of [the servant] were necessary to the 
performance by [the servant] of his duties as the employee of 
plaintiff, nor that he had ever previously been guilty of such 
or similar actions."so 
IV. THE MARYLAND CASE 
The F&D litigation was instituted in 1976. The issue, which 
previously had been addressed by only a few jurisdictions, would 
now be presented in Maryland: Should the insurance policy in 
question be construed in a manner allowing for indemnity against a 
punitive award? If so, would the public policy of the state allow for 
such indemnity? 
A. The Case In The Lower Court 
1. Background 
In July, 1976 the First National Bank of St. Mary'sSl and 
Thomas Combs, assistant manager of the Bank, brought a 
declaratory action in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County 
against the Fidelity & Deposit Company of MarylandS2 in which the 
Bank sought a declaration of its rights as insured and the rights of 
79.Id. 
BO. Id. at 60. 
B!. Sometimes referred to herein as "the Bank." 
B2. Sometimes referred to herein as "F & D." 
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the Fidelity & Deposit Company as insurer under a "Special Multi-
Peril Policy for Financial Institutions" issued by F & D to the 
Bank. 83 The declaratory judgment action sought answers to 
questions arising from a prior action filed in April, 1976 by Mrs. 
Alma Todd, a customer of the Bank, in the Circuit Court for St. 
Mary's County84 against the Bank and Mr. Combs, alleging that the 
Bank, through its officers, agents, and employees, including Combs, 
had maliciously prosecuted Mrs. Todd.85 Subsequently, the Bank 
requested that the insurer provide a defense to the suit. F & D, 
through its counsel, notified the Bank that it would provide 
insurance coverage for, and undertake the defense of, the compensa-
tory damages claim, but it would not provide insurance coverage for, 
or a defense of, the punitive damages claim. Thereafter, as a result of 
that communication, the Bank retained its own counsel to represent 
it in the tort action.86 Following the trial of that action, the jury 
returned a verdict of $4,000 compensatory damages against Mr. 
Combs and $4,000 compensatory and $8,000 punitive damages 
against the Bank alone.87 
Before the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, the Bank 
sought a judgment declaring that the insurer was obligated both to 
undertake the complete defense on behalf of the Bank and Mr. 
Combs in the Todd action irrespective of the types of damages 
claimed, and to pay all counsel fees and costs, including costs of the 
instant declaratory judgment action.88 The Bank also sought a 
finding that the insurer was obligated to pay on behalf of the Bank, 
all sums, including punitive damages, that the Bank was obligated 
to pay as a result of the Todd action.89 
Following a hearing,90 the trial judge, Howard S. Chasanow, 
rendered what the appellate court described as a "scholarly and well-
reasoned opinion"91 in which he held that the insurer was obligated 
83. See Joint Record Extract at 32-38, First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & 
Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359 (1978) [hereinafter "Record"]. 
84. That action was later removed to the Circuit Court for Calvert County where it 
was tried before a jury. An appeal was taken from the judgment in that case and 
was heard by the Court of Appeals on certiorari granted prior to hearing in the 
Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Appeals' decision in First Nat'l Bank of 
St. Mary's v. Todd, 283 Md. 251, 389 A.2d 371 (1978), was also filed on July 18, 
1978 as a companion decision to the F & D case. 
85. Record at 7. 
86.ld. 
87. ld. at 7-8. 
88. ld. at 8-9. 
89. ld. at 9. 
90. ld. at 72-102. 
91. First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 230, 389 
A.2d 359, 360 (1978). The trial court opinion in First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's at 
Leonardtown v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., Law No. 64, 391 (Cir. Ct. for Prince 
George's County, Maryland, filed June 28, 1977) is also contained in the Joint 
Record Extract. 
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to provide a defense in the Todd action on behalf of the Bank and 
therefore was liable for the cost incurred by the Bank in that 
defense.92 Because the insurer had unjustifiably refused to defend 
the Todd action from which the instant action arose,93 Judge 
Chasanow held that the insured Bank could also recover the counsel 
fees and costs incurred in bringing the declaratory judgment 
proceeding as well as the counsel fees expended to defend the initial 
action.94 
After deciding those two issues, the circuit court went on to rule 
that the insurance policy in question did provide coverage for the 
award of punitive damages assessed against the Bank,95 but that 
public policy precluded insuring against direct, rather than vicar-
ious, liability for punitive damages imposed against the Bank.96 
2. Policy Construction 
Since the Court of Appeals found the question was not properly 
before it,97 it quickly disposed of the issue of whether the insurance 
policy in question by its terms afforded coverage for the punitive 
damages assessed against the Bank. With neither quotations from 
the policy nor citation of authority, the court simply stated, 
In this instance, we have examined the policy provision 
in question and conclude that if the matter were properly 
before us we would hold that the trial judge did not err in 
92. Record at 10-12. The trial judge found the decision of the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland in Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842 
(1975), apposite to the case at bar. In Brohawn, the Court of Appeals held that an 
insured is not deprived of his contractual right to have a defense provided by the 
insurer when a conflict of interest between the two arises because the insured has 
been sued under a declaration stating both a cause of action covered by the 
policy and an alternative cause of action not covered by the policy: 
When such conflict arises, the insured must be informed of the nature of 
the conflict and given the right either to accept an independent attorney 
selected by the insurer or to select an attorney himself to conduct his 
defense. If the insured elects to choose his own attorney, the insurer must 
assume the reasonable costs of the defense provided. 
Id. at 414-15, 347 A.2d at 854. 
93. Record at 12. 
94. Id. at 12-13. Neither of these rulings was appealed. The circuit court noted that 
one exception to the general rule that counsel fees are not a proper element of 
damages was established in Cohen v. American Home Ins. Co., 255 Md. 334, 258 
A.2d 225 (1969). In Cohen, the Court of Appeals held that when an insurer 
unjustifiably refuses to defend a suit for damages and the insured brings a 
declaratory judgment action, the insured may recover the counsel fees and costs 
incurred in bringing the declaratory judgment proceeding as well as the counsel 
fees expended to defend the initial action. 
95. Record at 13-17. 
96. Id. at 24. 
97. First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 231, 389 
A.2d 359, 361 (1978). 
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determining that its provisions embraced an award for 
exemplary damages.98 
In light of this statement, the following review of the rationale 
applied by the lower court may provide some guidance to counsel 
attempting to determine the scope of coverage of policy provisions as 
they relate to coverage for awards of exemplary damages in 
Maryland.99 
The "Special Multi-Peril Policy for Financial Institutions" 
issued by F & D to the Bank explicitly provided coverage for the tort 
of malicious prosecution and contained the following "personal 
injury" liability endorsement: 
I. COVERAGE - PERSONAL INJURY LIABILITY 
The Company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums 
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of injury (herein called ((personal injury") 
sustained by any person or organization and arising out of 
one or more of the following offenses: 
Group A - false arrest, detention or imprisonment, or 
malicious prosecution; 
. . . [T]he company shall have the right and duty to 
defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on 
account of such personal injury even if any of the 
allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent. 
IV. AMENDED DEFINITION 
When used in reference to this insured: 'damages' means 
only those damages which are payable because of personal 
injury arising out of an offense to which this insurance 
applies. 100 
The circuit court began its analysis by noting that although the 
court was not aware of any cases involving the exact language in 
the policy at bar, several courts had already decided that "very 
similar" language in a liability policy provides coverage for punitive 
damages.101 Choosing two cases as illustrative of that proposition, 
98.Id. 
99. The Maryland appellate courts have not previously addressed the issue. 
100. Record at 6 (trial opinion; emphasis in original). 
101. Record at 14. See also Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 
1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. 
Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.w.2d 1 (1964); Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills, 345 
F. Supp. 1090 (S.D. Me. 1972); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 
S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d 
133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969). 
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the court noted that in Carro way v. Johnson 102 the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina had both pointed out that an insurer could inclq.de a 
clause in its insurance contract restricting liability or excluding 
coverage under certain conditions, and explained that punitive 
damages could only be sustained if there was an award for actual 
damages. Thereafter the South Carolina court construed the 
following policy provision: 
. 
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the 
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages 
because of: bodily injury . . . sustained by any person . . . 
arising out of the . . . use of the owned automobile or any 
non-owned automobile. 
and held that the language was 
sufficiently broad enough to cover liability for punitive 
damages as such damages are included in the "sums" which 
the insured is legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
bodily injury within the meaning of the policy.103 
The circuit court also quoted as follows from Southern Farm 
Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Daniel104 in which the Arkansas 
Supreme Court found coverage of punitive damages: 
As we read the policy herein it agrees to pay on behalf of 
the insurer all sums which the insured shall become 
LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO PAY AS DAMAGES, because 
of bodily injuries sustained. When we consider that under 
our law, one cannot become legally obligated to pay punitive 
damages unless actual damages have been sustained and 
assessed, we find that punitive damages constitute a sum 
which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of bodily injuries sustained. 105 
In support of its contention that punitive damages were not 
within the terms of its policy, F & D cited a 1973 Minnesota decision, 
Caspersen v. Webber,106 which decided that punitive damages were 
not included in "sums the insured shall be legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of bodily injury." Judge Chasanow, however, 
distinguished that case on the basis that the Minnesota court had 
102. 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965). 
103. [d. at 205. 139 S.E.2d at 910. 
104. 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969). 
105. [d. at 852, 440 S.W.2d at 584 (citing Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 
S.E.2d 908 (1965». 
106. 298 Minn. 93, 213 N.W.2d 327 (1973). 
244 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 8 
based its holding in part on the fact that in that state punitive 
damages are recoverable without proof of actual damages and 
therefore even in cases where there was no bodily injury, a plaintiff 
nonetheless might be entitled to exemplary damages. lo7 The trial 
judge noted that in Maryland, however, an award of punitive 
damages is dependent upon actual damages or actual injury since no 
punitive damages award can be made unless there is compensable 
injury and compensatory damages are awarded. IDS 
Of further significance to the circuit court was that the policy 
under consideration expressly covered the offense of malicious 
prosecution "for which the award of punitive damages is common in 
Maryland," and yet the insurer had failed to explicitly exclude 
punitive. damages from coverage under the policy.I09 The court stated 
that, given that failure to specifically exclude punitive damages, it 
would follow the rules that when the facts pertinent to a question of 
insurance coverage are undisputed, the issue is one of construction 
in light of the language employed in the contract, the subject matter, 
and the surrounding circumstances. 110 In case of ambiguities the 
policy is construed strictly against the company that prepared the 
policy and in favor ofthe insured. lll Accordingly, the court held that 
the F & D policy language at most could be regarded as ambiguous 
and therefore construed that language against F & D. Accordingly, 
the court held that punitive damages are included in the language 
"all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of injuries sustained by any person or organiza-
tion." 11 2 
3. Public Policy Considerations 
The approaches to the public policy questions taken by the Court 
of Appeals and by the circuit court differed considerably. Judge 
Chasanow began his analysis of the issue of whether insurance 
coverage for the punitive damages assessed against the Bank would 
107. Record at 15. 
108. Record at 16 (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans, 275 Md. 441, 446, 340 
A.2d 705, 708 (1975) and Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 265 Md. 631, 644,291 A.2d 64, 71 
(1972». See note 46 supra. 
109. Record at 16 (citing Price v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 
_, 502 P.2d 522, 525 (1972) ("In any event a court should not aid an insurer 
which fails to exclude liability for punitive damages. Surely there is nothing in 
the insuring clause that would forewarn an insured that such was to be the 
intent of the parties."». But see text accompanying notes 56-58 supra. 
110. Record at 15-16 (citing Wirterwerp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 Md. 714, 717, 357 
A.2d 350, 352-53 (1976) and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Humphrey. 246 Md. 492, 496,229 
A.2d 70, 72 (1967». 
111. Record at 16 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Humphrey. 246 Md. 492, 496, 229 A.2d 70, 
72 (1967». 
112. Record at 16-17. 
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be against public policy by stating that in states, like Maryland, l13 
that impose punitive damages for punishment and deterrence and 
not for compensation, "the weight of authority seems to be that it is 
against public policy for an insurance company to indemnify an 
individual tort-feasor for punitive damages as a result of his 
personal misconduct."114 The court also pointed out that most 
commentators favor the position that public policy should prevent 
an insurance company from issuing a policy that covers a client's 
liability for punitive damages for his own misconduct. ll5 
In support of the proposition that one cannot insure against an 
award of exemplary damages, the circuit court quoted at length from 
the leading case holding against insurance coverage for such 
damages, Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty: 11 6 
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment 
he gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the 
establishment of sanctions against such misconduct. It is 
not disputed that insurance against criminal fines or 
penalties would be void as violative of public policy. The 
same public policy should invalidate any contract of 
insurance against the civil punishment that punitive 
damages represent. 
The policy considerations in a state where, as in Florida 
and Virginia, punitive damages are awarded for punishment 
113. The court cited Wolfv. Levitt and Sons, Inc., 267 Md. 623, 626, 298 A.2d 374, 376 
(1972) and Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 430, 24 A.2d 917, 921 (1942). Record at 
17. 
114. Record at 17 (citing American Sur. Co. of New York v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th 
Cir. 1966) (applying Kansas law»; Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 
F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962) (applying either Florida or Virginia law); American Ins. 
Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257 (D. Conn. 1965) (dicta, applying Connecticut 
law); Nicholson v. American Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1965); Guardianship of Estate of Smith v. Merchants Mut. Bonding Co., 211 
Kan. 397, 507 P.2d 189 (1973); Padovan v. Clemente, 43 A.D.2d 729, 350 N.Y.S.2d 
694 (1973); LoRocco v. New Jersey Mfrs. Indem. Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323,197 
A.2d 591 (App. Div. 1964); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 
(1966). 
- 115. Record at 18-19. See, e.g., STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY PERSONAL INJURY 
AND DEATH ACTIONS § 201 (1972); Hall, The Validity of Insurance Coverage for 
Punitive Damages - An Unresolved Question?, 4 N.M.L. REV. 65 (1973); Obler, 
Insurance for Punitive Damages: A Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (1976); 
Comment, Public Policy Prohibits Insurance Indemnification Against Awards of 
Punitive Damages, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 944 (1963); Note, Exemplary Damages in 
the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1957); Comment, Insurer's Liability for 
Punitive Damages, 14 Mo. L. REV. 175 (1949); Comment, Insurance Coverage 
and the Punitive Damage Award in the Automobile Accident Case, 19 U. PITI'. L. 
REV. 144 (1957); Comment, Punitive Damages and Their Possible Application in 
Automobile Accident Litigation, 46 VA. L. REV. 1036 (1960). But see Lentz, 
Payment of Punitive Damages by Insurance Companies, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 
313 (1966); Note, Automobile Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages, 20 
S.C.L. REV. 71 (1968). 
116. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962). 
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and deterrence, would seem to require that the damages rest 
ultimately as well as nominally on the party actually 
responsible for the wrong. If that person were permitted to 
shift the burden to an insurance company, punitive damages 
would serve no useful purpose. Such damages do not 
compensate the plaintiff for his injury, since compensatory 
damages already have made the plaintiff whole. And there 
is no point in punishing the insurance company; it has done 
no wrong. In actual fact, of course, and considering the 
extent to which the public is insured, the burden would 
ultimately come to rest not on the insurance companies but 
on the public, since the added liability to the insurance 
companies would be passed along to the premium payers. 
Society would then be punishing itself for the wrong 
committed by the insured.1l7 
Judge Chasanow's analysis of the cases holding that public 
policy does not exclude insuring against punitive damages indicated 
to the circuit court that "almost all" of the cases could be 
distinguished from the one at bar, either because they involved 
"gross negligence" or something less than intentional acts, or 
because the punitive damages were imposed as a result of vicarious 
rather than direct liability.ll8 
Discussing the distinction ·between vicarious and direct liability 
coverage,119 the trial judge, citing Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. 
Welfare Finance Coy2!J and Sterling Insurance Co. v. Hughes,121 
noted that where punitive damages have been imposed on the 
insured solely as the result of vicarious liability, the great weight of 
authority is that insurance coverage of such damages does not 
violate public policy.122 This is true even though many ofthose same 
authorities also imply that their results might have been different 
had the insured participated in, authorized, or ratified the tortious 
conduct of its agents, employees, or other persons for whom it was 
117. Id. at 440. 
118. Record at 19. 
119. Because it held that the trial judge had not erred in holding that liability was 
direct rather than vicarious, the Court of Appeals did not need to draw a 
distinction between the public policy considerations concerning a punitive award 
assessed against one found vicariously liable and one found directly liable and 
therefore did not even mention the distinction. In light of the court's holding 
concerning insurance coverage in a direct liability situation, however, it is quite 
likely that the Maryland court would fmd coverage afforded in a vicarious 
liability situation. 
120. 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935). 
121. 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). 
122. See, e.g.,Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Reichard, 404 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1968); 
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 
U.S. 734 (1935); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 261 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1972). Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); 
Continental Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 307 S.W.2d (Ky. App. 1974). 
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vicariously responsible.123 Finding that authority persuasive, the 
trial judge stated that "the weight of authority and logic" compelled 
the court to hold that where punitive damages are based on vicarious 
liability no public policy is violated by allowing insurance cover-
age. 124 
Further distinguishing cases that uphold insurance coverage of 
punitive awards, the court noted that three of the leading cases125 
allowing insurance coverage for punitive damages deal with 
punitive damages imposed for gross negligence in auto accidents, 
"which may involve different considerations than in the instant 
case, where punitive damages were imposed for an intentional 
tort."126 The trial court stated that the only case of which it was 
aware that had considered the public policy question of insurance 
coverage for a punitive damages award against a corporation had 
not indicated whether the corporation's liability was imposed 
because of corporate acts or under the theory of respondeat 
superior.127 The court noted that persuasive arguments could be 
made that because a corporation can act only through its agents, it 
can only act vicariously and, therefore, should always be able to 
123. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Reichard, 404 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1968); 
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Finance Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 
295 U.S. 734 (1935); Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1972). 
124. Record at 22. 
125. Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972); 
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 
(1969); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 
(1964). 
126. Record at 20, quoting from Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 
Ark. 849, 852, 440 S.W.2d 582, 584 (1969) ("Neither can we find anything in the 
State's public policy that prevents an insurer from indemnifying its insured 
against punitive damages arising out of an accident, as distinguished from 
intentional torts."). Another case, Colson v. Lloyds of London, 435 S.W.2d 42 
(Mo. App. 1968), was distinguished because the court in that case held that it was 
not against public policy for police officers to insure themselves against the 
assessment of punitive damages for willful and intentional acts such as false 
arrest, but in doing so the court emphasized the negative effect that a contrary 
public policy would have on the recruitment of qualified police officers. Record at 
20. 
127. Record at 22. In Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 
124 (1969), the corporation had been found liable for punitive damages "for 
willful and wanton misconduct," and the appellate court, without indicating 
whether liability had been imposed because of corporate acts or under the theory 
of respondeat superior, simply stated, 
the appellant filed a supplemental list of authorities, which pertain to 
the right of an individual tortfeasor to insure himself against liability for 
his own acts. We have already noted that several jurisdictions arrive at 
various rules of law in that situation. This case is different, it involves 
only the right of a corporation to insure against liability caused by its 
agents or servants. There is no reasonable basis to declare the latter type 
of insurance is against public policy. 
105 Ill. App. 2d at 137, 245 N.E.2d at 126. 
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insure itself as an entity against punitive damages because of acts 
committed by its agents.128 Similarly, it could be argued, since the 
ultimate burden of a punitive award falls on a corporation's 
shareholders, corporations should be freely allowed to protect their 
shareholders by insurance.129 
The court believed, however, that those arguments failed to 
consider that where an employer authorizes, ratifies, or participates 
in an act of an employee, the employer is directly liable for punitive 
damages assessed as a result of the employee's actYlO It would 
therefore seem that an employer should not escape the full economic 
impact of that basic principle merely by incorporating.13l Further, 
punitive damages are often assessed as a result of a deliberately 
established corporate policy, not simply because of vicarious 
liability. 132 
Judge Chasanow believed that a number of abhorrent situations 
could easily be imagined in which a corporation, in an attempt to 
reap economic benefits, might adopt a policy of deliberate misrepre-
sentation or of deliberate violation of the rights of others. In such 
situations he expected that the threat of punitive damages would be 
an effective deterrent, but only if the corporate policy makers know 
that insurance would not cover such damages.133 Accordingly, the 
court observed that "[t]o always allow a corporation to escape, 
through insurance, a punitive damage award for deliberate corporate 
acts would seem violative of public policy."134 The circuit court found 
the issue in the instant case comparable to a situation in which a 
corporation is found guilty of a crime and sentenced to a fine,135 and 
it noted that an insurance policy permitting the insured to recover 
the amount of fines imposed for a violation of a criminal law would 
clearly be against public policy.13s Based upon the foregoing 
analysis, the circuit court held, 
128. Record at 22. 
129. Id. 
130. See text accompanying notes 74-80 supra. 
131. Record at 22-23. 
132. Id. at 23. See, e.g., Summit Loans, Inc. v. Pecola, 265 Md. 43, 288 A.2d 114 (1972) 
(award of punitive damages against a loan corporation for invasion of privacy 
allowed where court found sufficient evidence to show that corporation had 
deliberate and persistent policy to harass debtor and iritimidate her into 
repaying loan); GAl Audio of New York, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 
Inc., 27 Md. App. 172, 340 A.2d 736 (1975). 
133. For an analysis of such a rationale, see Obler, Insurance for Punitive Damages: 
A Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 466-74 (1976). 
134. Record at 23. 
135. Id. (noting that according to 10 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS 
§ 4942 at 67 (1963, Supp. 1976) the general rule appears to be that a corporation 
may be held criminally responsible for the illegal acts of its employees if such 
acts are "(1) related to and committed within the course of employment; (2) 
committed in furtherance of the business of the corporation; and (3) authorized or 
acquiesced in by the corporation."). 
136. Record at 23-24 (citing 43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 241 (1969) and 44 C.J.S. 
Insurance § 242 (1945». 
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that where a corporation is held liable for punitive damages, 
and an insurance policy is in 'effect which covers punitive 
damages, the insurer is liable for the amount of the punitive 
damages unless the insurer can show it would be against 
public policy for the corporation to shift the penalty to the 
insurer. This could be done by showing that the corporation 
through its officers, directors, etc., authorized, or ratified the 
act that gave rise to the punitive damages. 137 
249 
In the instant case, it was clear to the court that the insurer had 
met its burden and established that the corporation, its insured, was 
directly, rather than vicariously, liable for the punitive damages 
imposed against it for the malicious prosecution of Mrs. Todd. 
Accordingly, public policy precluded insuring against the punitive 
damages awarded against the Bank. 
B. The Court of Appeals Opinion 
The circuit court's decision was appealed by the plaintiff 
Bank.13B The central issue on appeal was whether the circuit court 
had been correct in holding that the public policy of Maryland would 
not allow for insurance coverage of the punitive damages assessed 
against the Bank.139 
137. Record at 24. 
138. ld. The Bank had appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and the Court of 
Appeals granted the Bank's petition for a writ of certiorari prior to argument in 
the Court of Special Appeals. 
139. The Bank had also asserted that the trial court was in error in holding that the 
Bank's liability in the Todd case was direct rather than vicarious. See text 
accompanying notes 125-37 supra. Pointing out that the Bank had overlooked 
the written stipulation of facts the parties entered into in the case, the Court of 
Appeals quickly disposed of the Bank's argument by holding that the circuit 
court had not erred in determining that liability was direct rather than vicarious. 
283 Md. at 231, 389 A.2d at 361. 
The parties had stipulated as follows: 
6. Counsel for Alma Todd wrote a letter to the First National Bank 
of St. Mary's County outlining the defenses of Alma Todd and 
requesting that the matter be handled civilly rather than through 
criminal prosecution. After advice of counsel, it was the corporate 
decision of the First National Bank of St. Mary's County to continue 
with the criminal prosecution. 
7. After consultation with counsel, the First National Bank of St. 
Mary's County, as a matter of corporate policy, rejected the offers of 
Alma Todd and made the corporate decision in the furtherance of the 
business purposes of the corporation to prosecute Alma Todd. 
ld. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added by court). 
F & D also argued that the terms of the policy itself did not provide coverage 
for exemplary damages but the Court of Appeals held that that issue was not 
properly before it. The court, however, also concluded that had the issue been 
properly preserved for review, it would have held that the circuit court had not 
erred in determining that the policy terms covered punitive damages assess· 
ments. ld. See text accompanying note 98 supra. 
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Noting that Mrs. Todd's action against the Bank and its 
employee was for malicious prosecution, the majority acknowledged 
that the Court of Appeals had previously stated that punitive 
damages were properly recoverable in such an action if a jury found 
"a want of probable cause."140 Writing for the majority, Judge Smith 
then pointed out that in one of its latest pronouncements concerning 
punitive damages141 the court had stated that exemplary damages 
"are awarded, over and above all compensation, to punish the 
wrongdoer, to teach him not to repeat his wrongful conduct and to 
deter others from engaging in the same conduct."142 According to the 
majority, it is from such statements that the public policy 
argument is constructed, that if the wrongdoer may have someone 
else bear the expense of paying such an assessment, the deterrent 
effect is lost.143 Pointing out that a large number of cases involve 
claims arising from auto accidents, the court acknowledged that 
there is a split of authority as to whether it is against public policy to 
provide insurance coverage for punitive damages.144 
140. 283 Md. at 232, 389 A.2d at 361 (quoting Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 
168, 177, 122 A.2d 457, 462 (1956». For other cases discussing punitive damages 
awards in malicious prosecution actions, see Montgomery Ward & Co. v. 
Keulemans, 275 Md. 441, 340 A.2d 705 (1975); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Brooks, 
264 Md. 578, 278 A.2d 251 (1972). 
141. Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976). 
142. 283 Md. at 232,389 A.2d at 361 (quoting Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 
524, 531, 336 A.2d 7, 12 (1976». 
143. 283 Md. at 232, 389 A.2d at 361. The dissent emphasized that prior case law 
mandated such a conclusion: 
If we assume, as our prior case law says we must, that the goals of 
punishing and deterring extreme and outrageous behavior are subserved 
by allowing punitive damages in appropriate cases, it follows inexorably 
that the burden of the penalty so assessed must be borne exclusively by 
the culpable party. The risk of such a loss thus cannot, consistent with 
the theory behind exemplary damage awards, be shifted to a third party, 
be it a surety, an insurance company or the public at large. 
283 Md. at 246, 389 A.2d at 368 (citing Butler v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 265 Or. 
473, 509 P.2d 1184 (1973». 
144. The court noted that cases holding against such coverage include American Sur. 
Co. of New York v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966) (applying Kansas law); 
Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962) (applying 
Virginia and Florida law); Ging v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 293 F. Supp. 756 
(N.D. Fla. 1968) (applying Florida law); Commercial Union Ins. Co. of New York 
v. Reichard, 262 F. Supp. 275 (S.D. Fla. 1966) (applying Florida law); American 
Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257 (D. Conn. 1965) (applying Connecticut law); 
Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941); Crull v. Gleb, 
382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964); Newark v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 134 
N.J. Super. 537, 342 A.2d 513 (App. Div. 1975); LoRocco v. New Jersey Mfrs. 
Indem. Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323, 197 A.2d 591 (App. Div. 1964); and Esmond v. 
Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966). 
Cases holding that public policy does not bar insurance coverage of punitive 
awards include Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Title Guarantee Co., 520 F.2d 1170 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975); Price v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 
(1972); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849,440 S.W.2d 
582 (1969); Greenwood Cemetery v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, 232 S.E.2d 
910 (1977); Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 
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Recognizing Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty145 
as the leading case denying coverage on public policy grounds,146 the 
court, as had the trial judge, quoted what has come to be the legal 
touchstone for denying coverage on public policy grounds. 147 Stating 
that Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance CO.148 is the 
"premier case" holding insurance coverage for exemplary damages 
not barred by public policy,149 Judge Smith quoted as well from the 
Lazenby opinion: 
We accept, as common knowledge, the fact death and 
injuries on our highways and streets is a very serious 
problem and such is a matter ·of great public concern. We 
further accept, as common knowledge, socially irresponsible 
drivers, who by their actions in operation of motor vehicles, 
could be liable for punitive damages are a great part of this 
problem. We, however, are not able to agree the closing of 
the insurance market, on the payment of punitive damages, 
to such drivers would necessarily accomplish the result of 
deterring them in their wrongful conduct. This State, in 
regard to the proper operation of motor vehicles, has a great 
many detailed criminal sanctions, which apparently have 
not deterred this slaughter on our highways and streets. 
Then to say the closing of the insurance market, in the 
payment of punitive damages, would act to deter guilty 
drivers would in our opinion contain some element of 
speculation. ISO 
Judge Smith then noted that the following observations from the 
majority opinion in Harrell v. Travelers Indemnity CO.151 also 
applied to the instant case: 
[T]his case does not involve the application of any settled 
and established rule of contract 'public policy,' but the 
adoption in Oregon of a proposed new rule of 'public policy' 
under which both existing and future insurance contracts 
which undertake to provide protection from liability for 
punitive damages would be held to be invalid. 
It has been said of 'public policy' as a ground for 
invalidation by the courts of private contracts that "those 
95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); Continental Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 
146 (Ky. 1974); Colson v. Lloyd's of London, 435 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App. 1968); 
Harrell v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977); and Lazenby 
v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964). 
145. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962). See text accompany notes 116-18 supra. 
146. 283 Md. at 233, 389 A.2d at 362. 
147. See text accompanying note 117 supra. 
148. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964). See text accompanying notes 67-73 supra. 
149. 283 Md. at 234, 389 A.2d at 363. 
150. 214 Tenn. at 647, 383 S.W.2d at 5. 
151. 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977). 
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two alliterative words are often used as if they had a magic 
quality and were self explanatory ... " and that for a court 
to undertake to invalidate private contracts upon the ground 
of 'public policy' is to mount "a very unruly horse, and when 
you once get astride it you never know where it will carry 
yoU."152 
Other statements in Harrell were also found by the F & D 
majority to be apropos. As one example of what it considered could 
be the unfortunate result if insurance coverage against punitive 
damages were held against public policy, the Harrell court had said, 
The owner of a retail store who causes the arrest and 
prosecution of a suspected shoplifter under circumstances 
not sufficient to constitute "probable cause" may also have 
an uninsurable liability for punitive damages because the 
jury may make a finding of malice based upon lack of 
probable cause. 
Under the rule proposed by the defendant, and as held 
by the trial court, even though the risks involved in each of 
these examples were of such a nature as to be encountered in 
the operation of such business or professions, and the 
conduct involved did not involve "intentionally inflicted 
injury," any contract with an insurance company to provide 
protection against the risk of punitive damages as the result 
of such conduct would become invalid as a matter of "public 
policy," regardless of whether the insurance contract was 
negotiated upon payment of an additional premium for 
protection against such liability.153 
The Harrell court observed that it is naive to hold an insurance 
contract covering punitive damages invalid as contrary to public 
policy on the grounds that such coverage would result in punishment 
to the insurer or society as a whole. The Harrell majority emphasized 
the right of an insurance company to contract as it saw fit: 
[A]n insurance company which deliberately enters into a 
contract to provide coverage against liability for punitive 
damages is free to charge either a separate or additional 
premium for that risk. Conversely, if an insurance contract 
excludes coverage for liability against punitive damages no 
such additional premium need be charged and the insurance 
company may charge a lower premium for such a policy.154 
152. 279 Or. at 209-10, 567 P.2d at 1016 (quoting 6A A. CORBIN CONTRACTS § 1375 at 
10 (1962) and 14 S. WILLISTON, LAw OF CONTRACTS § 1629, at 7-8 (3d ed. 1972». 
(footnotes omitted). 
153. 279 Or. at 210-11, 567 P.2d at 1018-19 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted). 
154. Id. 
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The Oregon court had pointed out that alternatives such as 
elimination of punitive damages, limitations on amounts of punitive 
awards, or limiting liability to such flagrant misconduct as 
intentionally inflicted injury, might be preferable to the then-
existing law in Oregon but noted that such "possible alternatives 
might more appropriately be considered by the legislature, rather 
than by the COUrts."I55 Judge Smith believed that the same 
comments could be made relative to Maryland. I56 
The F & D court summarized the Harrell dissent by quoting the 
following statement: 
The purpose of compensatory damages is to compensate, 
and this purpose is carried out no matter who is held 
ultimately responsible for payment. The purpose of punitive 
damages, on the other hand, is to deter, and this purpose is 
not carried out if the one who ultimately pays is an insurer 
rather than the wrongdoer.I57 
Though finding that the McNulty opinion and Harrell dissent 
have a "theoretical, intellectual"158 appeal, the majority stated that 
that appeal fades materially when the problem is surveyed "in 
practical terms looking at certain bench marks for guidance."159 
Conducting that survey, the majority found guidance for its decision 
in a century-old statement made in Estate of Woods, Weeks & CO.:I60 
[T]he right of parties to contract as they please is 
restricted only by a few well defmed and well settled rules, 
and it must be a very plain case to justify a court in holding 
a contract to be against public policy. It must be a case in 
which the common sense of the entire community would so 
pronounce it.I61 
155. Id. at 216, 567 P.2d at 1021. 
156. 283 Md. at 237, 389 A.2d at 364. 
157. 279 Or. at 229-30, 567 P.2d at 1028. 
158. 283 Md. at 238, 389 A.2d at 364. 
159. Id. 
160. 52 Md. 520 (1879). Judge Levine in dissent said the majority's reliance upon that 
case controvenes the principle of stare decisis and "abandon[s] controlling 
authority barely two months old in favor of . . . outmoded and patently 
inadequate precedent." 283 Md. at 244-45 n.2, 389 A.2d at 368 n.2. 
161. 52 Md. at 536. In Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v. 
Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 386 A.2d 1216 (1978), Judge Levine 
observed that "[e]nforcement [of contract provisions] will be denied only where 
the factors that argue against implementing the particular provision clearly and 
unequivocally outweigh 'the law's traditional interest in protecting the 
expectations of the parties, its abhorrence of any unjust enrichment, and any 
public interest in the enforcement' of the contested term." Id. at 607, 386 A.2d at 
1229 (citation omitted). 
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Having thus set the :tone for his further discussion of public 
policy considerations, Judge Smith pointed out the cautious 
approach to be taken by a court when making public policy. 
determinations, by quoting from Patton v. United States: 162 
The truth is that the theory of public policy embodies a 
doctrine of vague and variable quality and, unless deducible 
in the given circumstances from constitutional or statutory 
provisions, should be accepted as the basis of a judicial 
determination, if at alL only with the utmost circumspection. 
The public policy of one generation may not, under changed 
conditions, be the public policy of another.163 
Noting again that the legislature is the normal policy-declaring 
department of the government,164 the court stated that "when the 
General Assembly has desired to forbid protection by insurance from 
the equivalent of exemplary damages, it has done so explicitly."165 
The court found that the only instance in which the General 
Assembly had seen fit to make a pronouncement on the subject was 
with regard to claims in. workmen's compensation cases where a 
statute provides that wh~n doubled payments are awarded against 
the employer to an illegally employed minor, his employer cannot be 
indemnified by insurance for the extra punitive part of the award.16S 
The court reached the:heart of the decision after listing contracts 
which it had "no doubt that the common sense of the entire 
community . . . would in each instance pronounce . . . void as 
162. 281 U.S. 276 (1930). 
163. 281 U.S. at 306. The Court of Appeals also quoted from W. BRANTLEY, LAW OF 
CONTRACT (2d ed. 1922) where that text discusses agreements contrary to public 
policy: "Another element Of uncertainity in the application of this principle is 
that the popular, and consequently the judicial view of what is right and wrong, 
fair and unfair, changes and varies in a silent and unconscious growth. What 
one generation deems fair and right is in the mores of age, and another 
generation may deem it wrong, and that makes it wrong." Id. at 220-21 (footnote 
omitted). 
164. 283 Md. at 239, 389 A.2d' at 365 (citing 4 S. WILLISTON, LAw OF CONTRACTS 
§ 1629A at 4558 n.4 (rev. ed. S. Williston & G. Thompson 1937». See also text 
accompanying note 156 supra. 
165. 283 Md. at 239, 389 A.2d at 365. 
166. Id. at 243, 389 A.2d at 367. Section 47 of the Maryland Workmen's Compensation 
Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 101 (Supp. 1978) states in part: "All compensation and 
death benefits provided by this article, however, may be doubled in the discretion 
of the Commission in the case of any minor employed illegally under the laws of 
this State, and no insurance policy shall be available to protect the employer of 
such minor from the payment of the extra or additional compensation or benefits 
to be awarded by reason of ' such illegal employment, but the employer alone shall 
be liable for the said increased amounts of compensation or death benefits." 
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against public policy."167 Then determining that the common sense 
of the community would in fact demand that punitive damages 
assessed against a small businessman be satisfied through the 
insurance for which he paid, the court observed, 
If we were to hold that F & D was barred by public 
policy from paying the exemplary damages assessed against 
the Bank and thus that it had to be paid by the stockholders 
of the Bank, such a holding would have implications far 
beyond this case, as was pointed out forcefully in Harrell. It 
would be equally applicable to the small businessman who 
has attempted to protect his business by purchasing various 
. types of liability insurance. If we were to determine that it is 
against public policy for one to protect himself by insurance 
against exemplary damages, such a small businessman 
could be crippled or virtually wiped out by an assessment of 
exemplary damages in a malicious prosecution action where 
he proceeded with what he regarded as good reason to 
prosecute a shoplifter but the courts found that he lacked 
probable cause for such pursuit. The same would be true of 
the small businessman who is angered at being given a bad 
check for a past due account and then proceeds to swear out 
a warrant for the arrest of that individual, not being 
cognizant of the fact that to constitute a violation of our 
statute there must be a present consideration. It is not an 
adequate answer' to such concerns to say that the trier of 
fact assessing such damages had before it the net worth of 
the offending party, because insofar as many small business 
people are concerned that new worth will to a large degree be 
composed of their home and the stock in trade or other 
assets of their business. We suspect that in such situations 
the common sense of the entire community would not 
construe such insurance contracts to be against public 
policy. In fact, we strongly suspect that the common sense of 
the community as a whole would expect a judgment 
167. 283 Md. at 240, 389 A.2d at 365 (referring to Estate of Woods, Weeks & Co., 52 
Md. 520 (1879». As examples of such contracts, the court listed 
... agreements having a tendency to obstruct or interfere with the 
administration of justice, or to injure public service; contracts clearly 
repugnant to sound morality, such as contracts based on illicit 
association or intercourse; agreements to commit a crime or to reward 
one for the commission of a crime or for the suppression or compounding 
of a crime; agreements to wrong or defraud third persons; and contract 
provisions for immunity from bad faith or fraud, ... contracts which 
aid the enemy or operate to the disadvantage of the country in time of 
war; ... those for rewards for the arrest of persons where the arrest 
would. be illegal; a sham agreement intended to enable one party to 
reduce his tax liability; contracts involving the unlawful practice of law; 
and contracts not within the powers conferred on banks and which 
jeopardize the safety of bank deposits. 
283 Md. at 240, 389 A.2d at 365 (citations omitted). 
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including exemplary damages to be satisfied through the 
insurance policies for which such small business people 
have paid. It would be outraged and have substantial 
difficulty in comprehending the reasons for a holding to the 
contrary.168 
Countering the contention that permitting payment of punitive 
damages by an insurance company eliminates deterrence, the court 
noted that deterrence of wrondgoing would be prompted by the 
potential wrongdoer's knowledge that persons who are shown by 
experience to be poor risks encounter difficulty in obtaining 
insuranceI69 or may become subject to policies written with 
retrospective premiums where the premium is computed after losses 
are determined.170 
Finally, the court stated that in the past insurance companies 
have not shown reluctance to write restrictions in their own best 
interests into insurance policies; yet no such restriction was included 
in the F & D policy. The majority stated that in the fourteen years 
since Lazenby l71 insurers surely were cognizant of the fact that they 
might be called upon to pay punitive awards and "probably have 
considered such a possibility in establishing rates."172 
Therefore, having found "not the slightest suggestion of a 
'constitutional or statutory provision' from which a public policy 
against payment is deducible,"173 the court held that the common 
sense of the entire community would not pronounce it against public 
policy for F & D to pay the judgment for exemplary damages 
assessed against the Bank. 174 
C. The Dissent 
Judge Levine began his analytical dissent by stating that, 
Swayed by what it terms "practical" considerations, the 
majority ... has sub silentio dealt a death blow to the 
theory of exemplary damages applied in Maryland for well 
over a century.175 
168. 283 Md. at 241, 389 A.2d at 366 (citation omitted). 
169. Id. at 242, 389 A.2d at 366. 
170. Id. 
171. Lazenby v. Universal Underwriter Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964). 
172. 283 Md. at 243, 389 A.2d at 362. But see text accompanying notes 217-33 infra. 
173. Id. (citing Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930». 
174. Id. 
175. 283 Md. at 243-44, 389 A.2d at 367 (footnote omitted). Judge Levine noted that 
"although punitive damages have been recognized by the common law since the 
mid·eighteenth century, Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 207 (K.B. 1763), the first 
Maryland decision expressly recognizing the doctrine was handed down in 1857. 
Gaither v. Blowers, 11 Md. 536, 552-53 (1857)." 283 Md. at 244 n.l, 389 A.2d at 
367 n.!. 
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Referring to the court's responsibility to balance carefully the public 
and private interests in determining whether to enforce a contractu-
al provision asserted to be void as against public policy,176 the 
dissent found that among those factors that militate against 
enforcement of such a contract provision are the strength of the 
public policy as manifested by either legislation or judicial decisions 
and the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the disputed term will 
further the policy.177 Since punitive damages, as distinguished from 
compensatory or nominal damages, are awarded "to punish 
reprehensible and outrageous conduct and to set an example which 
will serve to deter the wrongdoer and others from engaging in such 
conduct in the future,"178 it was Judge Levine's opinion that these 
policies weighed against enforcement of the insurance contract 
provision at hand, and could be promoted only by denying 
enforcement of insurance agreements that indemnify adjudicated 
intentional tort-feasors against punitive awards. "A contrary result 
... would in practical effect, be tantamount to abolishing punitive 
damages altogether."179 Assuming, as Judge Levine found prior case 
law required, that the goals of punishing and deterring extreme and 
outrageous behavior are subserved by allowing punitive damages in 
appropriate cases, the dissent determined that, 
Logic therefore demands that individuals or enterprises 
directly responsible for the commission of outrageous 
injurious acts be prohibited from escaping the impact of an 
award of exemplary damages through the simple expedient 
of purchasing liability insurance. l80 
176. 283 Md. at 244, 389 A.2d at 367 (quoting Maryland-National Capital Park and 
Planning Comm'n v. Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 607, 386 A.2d 1216, 
1229 (1978»: 
Enforcement will be denied only where the factors that argue against 
implementing the particular provision clearly and unequivocally 
outweigh the law's traditional interest in protecting the expectations of 
the parties, its abhorrence of any unjust enrichment, and any public 
interest in the enforcement of the contested term. 
177. 283 Md. at 244, 389 A.2d at 367 (citing Maryland·National Capital Park and 
Planning Comm'n v. Washington Nat'! Arena, 282 Md. 588, 386 A.2d 1216 
(1978». 
178. 283 Md. at 245, 389 A.2d at 368 (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 
627, 638, 381 A.2d 16, 22 (1977) and citing Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 
Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9 
at 205 (1973». The dissent also noted that aside from punishment and deterrence, 
punitive damages may serve to channel a plaintiffs anger from retaliating 
against a defendant or may simply reflect social outrage apart from any 
remedial purpose. 283 Md. at 245-46 n.3, :389 A.2d at 368 n.3 (citinJ{ Harrell v. 
Traveler's Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977) (Linde, J., dissenting) 
and Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Law, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1l9H (1931». 
179. 283 Md. at 245, 389 A.2d at 368. 
180. Id. at 246, 389 A.2d at 368. 
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Judge Levine found that the majority's argument in favor of 
permitting insurance for punitive damages liability, when reduced to 
its essentials, "is founded on a noble but rather misplaced solicitude 
for the economic well-being of small businessmen."181 Arguing 
against the majority's position in that regard, the dissent pointed 
out that punitive damages may be awarded only when "the tortious 
conduct can be described as extreme or outrageous, similar to that 
usually found in crime."182 Accordingly, when even a small 
businessman's conduct is so reprehensible that he exposes himself to 
the risk of liability for damages in excess of those necessary to 
compensate his victim, he is entitled to no more or less protection 
than others who commit acts of a similar kind deserving the 
imposition of punitive damages: 
Even though financial disaster may be the immediate 
consequence of a punitive damage award, there is no 
injustice in the eyes of the law, provided the punishment 
exacted reasonably corresponds to the gravity of the tortious 
conduct involved.183 
The dissent next addressed the troublesome fact that only in 
malicious prosecution actions is it possible for a plaintiff to recover 
punitive damages, even though viewed objectively, the defendant's 
conduct is not truly extreme or outrageous. Judge Levine noted that 
whenever a defendant is found guilty of malicious prosecution, 
punitive damages may be awarded184 on the theory that the malice 
necessary to support the punitive award is an element of the tort 
itself.185 Further, though malice must be shown in order to support a 
malicious prosecution action,186 that malice need not be proved 
separately but may be inferred from want of probable cause on the 
part of the defendant. 187 And, based on that inferrence, punitive 
damages may be recovered.188 In Judge Levine's opinion, however, 
"a finding that a defendant instituted criminal proceedings against 
the plaintiff based on something less than probable cause does not 
necessarily mean that the defendant's conduct in this regard was 
either extreme or outrageous."189 In his view, such an aberration in 
181. Id. at 247, 389 A.2d at 369. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 248, 389 A.2d at 369 (citing Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 
122 A.2d 457 (1956». . 
185. Id. (citing Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972». 
186. Id. (citing Cecil v. Clarke, 17 Md. 508 (1861». 
187. Id. (citing Exxon Corp. v. Kelly, 281 Md. 689, 381 A.2d 1146 (1978». 
188. Id. (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans, 275 Md. 441, 340 A.2d 705 
(1975». 
189. Id. at 248, 389 A.2d at 369-70. 
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the law of damages did not allow the majority to "justify a broad-
sweeping rule allowing persons to insure themselves against 
punitive damage awards in all tort cases where such damages are 
otherwise available."l90 The better approach to such a situation 
would be to modify the present law by requiring a higher degree of 
offensiveness as a prerequisite to punitive damages recovery in 
malicious prosecution actions, thereby assuring that punitive 
damages would be assessed in all tort actions according to a uniform 
standard of culpability and would comport with the punitive and 
deterrent function of such awards. 191 An alternative, though less 
desirable, course of action would be to permit parties to insure 
against punitive damages only in those malicious prosecution 
actions in which liability is predicated upon implied malice.192 
Judge Levine noted that the deterrent function of punitive 
damages should not be overestimated. For example, one acting out of 
anger or hate in commiting an assault is unlikely to be deterred by 
fear of punitive damages. He believed, on the other hand, that a tort-
feasor engaging in intentional misconduct pursuant to a well defined 
corporate policy would be more likely to pause and consider the 
consequences if aware that his wrongdoing may expose him to 
punitive liability.193 He disagreed, however, with the majority's 
suggestion that the deterrent effect of punitive damages will be 
preserved because tort-feasors found to be poor risks will have 
difficulty in obtaining insurance. Judge Levine felt that though poor 
risks may be required to pay higher premiums, an increase in 
premium rates spread over a number of months, probably tax 
deductible, would be far less effective as a deterrent than the threat 
of sudden and severe economic loss caused by a lump sum judgment 
for which the defendant is solely responsible. 194 
Finally, the dissent addressed the majority's reliance upon the 
fact that the General Assembly had not acted to prohibit insurers 
from providing liability coverage against punitive damages awards. 
Stating that public policy is not derived exclusively from constitu-
tional provisions and legislative enactments as the majority 
indicated, it was Judge Levine's opinion that where the controversy 
centers around the application of a common law doctrine such as 
punitive damages, the fact that the legislature has not intervened 
indicated that it was willing to allow the courts to continue to control 
the evolution of the law. Accordingly, the proper application of 
judicially defmed policies dealing with punitive damages was 
190. [d. at 248, 389 A.2d at 370. 
191. [d. at 248-49, 389 A.2d at 370. 
192. [d. at 248, 389 A.2d at 370. 
193. [d. at 249 n.5, 389 A.2d at 370 n.5. 
194. [d. at 249, 389 A.2d at 370. 
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squarely within the competence of the court to resolve and, therefore, 
in the dissent's opinion, the court should have held that insurance 
against liability for punitive damages offended the public policy of 
this state. 195 
V. A REVIEW 
The opinion rendered by the majority of the F & D court leaves 
unanswered some questions concerning the scope and the applicabil-
ity of the court's holding to future cases involving the issue of 
insurance coverage for punitive damages and, possibly, even to 
cases dealing with the initial question of whether a punitive award 
may be assessed against a defendant himself. 
Judge Levine may have been correct in his assessment of the 
majority's treatment of the theoretical basis for imposition of 
punitive damages in Maryland when he stated that the court had 
"sub silentio dealt a death blow to the theory of exemplary damages 
applied in Maryland [in a] radical transformation of the law of 
punitive damages."196 The Court of Appeals, for well over a century, 
has stated and reiterated the basic premise that punitive damages 
are awarded to punish and to deter reprehensible conduct. 197 The F & 
D majority acknowledged that rationale at the outset. of its 
opinion. 198 The court, however, went on to conclude that the 
"theoretical, intellectual" appeal of opinions from other courts, 
which had determined that the deterrent effect of punitive damages 
would be lost if an insurer instead of the tort-feasor pays the 
exemplary award, faded when examined from a practical view-
point.199 That "practical" view, however, focused on the theoretical 
potential for financial harm, which the majority opined could befall a 
small businessman 200 if he were to be the subject of a large punitive 
award. The majority, moreover, did not directly address the dissent's 
argument that a small businessman who is guilty of extreme and 
outrageous conduct should be entitled to no more or less solicitude 
than any other defendant who has committed reprehensible acts if 
the punishment imposed reasonably corresponds to the enormity of 
195. Id. at 250, 389 A.2d at 371. 
196. Id. at 243-44, 389 A.2d at 367. 
197. See, e.g., note 10 supra. 
198. 283 Md. at 232, 389 A.2d at 361 (citing Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 
524, 366 A.2d 712 (1976)). 
199. 283 Md. at 238, 389 A.2d at 364. 
200. Id. at 241, 389 A.2d at 366; see text accompanying note 168 supra. In dissent 
Judge Levine observed, 
The majority's preoccupation with the plight of the small business 
community is somewhat surprising considering the fact that the 
tortfeasor in this case is one of southern Maryland's leading banking 
institutions and thus hardly qualifies as a small business. 
Id. at 247 n.4. 389 A.2d at 369 n.4. 
1979] Punitive Damages 261 
the tortious conduct. Instead, inferentially acknowledging that a 
jury evaluating a punitive claim may be presented with evidence of a 
defendant's fmancial standing, 20 1 the court expressed its concern 
that a small businessman may be "crippled or virtually wiped out by 
an assessment of exemplary damages,"202 stating: 
It is not an adequate answer to such concerns to say that the 
trier of fact assessing such damages has before it the net 
worth of the offending party, because insofar as many small 
business people are concerned that net worth will, to a large 
degree, be composed of their home and the stock in trade or 
other assets of their business.203 
Not addressed, however, were past pronouncements that punitive 
awards should be tailored to both the enormity of the act and the 
particular circumstances of the actor.204 In light of such statements, 
the majority could have acknowledged even more readily, and more 
consistently with past pronouncements, that once the small 
businessman's net worth has been introduced into evidence, he 
should be allowed to offer countervailing evidence to explain his 
financial status in an attempt to mitigate against an enormous 
award. The ability to present such evidence would allow the 
defendant the opportunity to convince a jury that any exemplary 
award should be only punitive; not ruinous. F~iling in that 
endeavor, such a presentation by the defendant nonetheless gives 
him the opportunity to lay the groundwork to request an order of 
remittitur should the jury return an excessive punitive verdict. 205 
Perhaps the majority was correct when it posited the negative 
statement that, 
It can not properly be said that permitting payment of 
exemplary damages by an insurance company eliminates 
deterrence, notwithstanding the fact that the loss is thus 
spread across a number of policy holders through the 
payment of premiums ... because those who are demon-
strated by experience to be poor risks encounter substantial 
difficulty in obtaining insurance, a fact such persons 
know. 206 
201. See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra. 
202. 283 Md. at 241, 389 A.2d at 366. 
203. Id. 
204. See Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423,429-31, 24 A.2d 917, 921 (1942); Sloan v. 
Edwards, 61 Md. 89, 100 (1883); Gaither v. Blowers, 11 Md. 536, 542 (1857). 
205. Ct. Kneas v. Hecht Co., 257 Md. 121, 262 A.2d 518 (1970) (after defendant's 
motion for judgment n.o.v. on punitive damages was granted, new trial was 
ordered unless plaintiff agreed to remittitur on compensatory damages); Turner 
v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 221 Md. 494, 158 A.2d 125 (.1960) 
(defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. was granted and trial court ordered new 
trial unless remittitur was accepted by plaintiff). 
206. 283 Md. at 242, 389 A.2d at 366. 
262 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 8 
Yet, it is difficult to fault the logic of Judge Levine's statement that 
such minimal deterrence is hardly comparable to the deterrent effect 
which might be gained by the knowledge that the defendant may be 
solely responsible for a large lump sum punitive judgment. 207 
It seems clear that as Judge Levine said in his dissent, "[w]hat 
troubles the majority is the fact that in malicious prosecution actions 
(and in those cases alone), it is possible under existing Maryland law 
for a plaintiff to recover punitive damages even though the 
defendant's conduct, objectively viewed, is not truly extreme or 
outrageous."208 Writing for the majority, Judge Smith placed 
significant emphasis on the fact that the underlying cause of action 
for which punitive damages had been awarded in the instant case 
had been the tort of malicious prosecution.209 That fact made the 
case an unfortunate vehicle by which to deal with the question of 
insurance coverage for punitive damages because of the nature of 
the proof of malice that may be established to support a punitive 
award for that tort.210 
Judge Levine's statement that the court had dealt a death blow 
to the theory of punitive damages may be of only academic, not 
practical, import. The majority did acknowledge the punitive/deter-
rent rationale of punitive damages and did not overtly stray from 
that rationale, instead taking pains to opine that the deterrent effect 
would be subserved through the inability of a wrongdoer to obtain 
insurance.211 Further, even if one assumes that the rationale 
underlying punitive awards has been altered by F & D, the fact that 
the case dealt with the tort of malicious prosecution may readily 
provide the basis for limiting the impact of the decision to actions 
dealing only with that tort. Accordingly, it is appropriate to assume 
at this juncture that the court's opinion will have significant 
practical effect only upon the narrower issues involving insurance 
coverage for punitive damages. 
Whether Judge Levine was correct when he made the sweeping 
statement that the majority had built upon the anomaly of malicious 
prosecution law a broad-sweeping rule allowing persons to insure 
themselves against punitive damages awards in all tort cases where 
such damages are otherwise available212 cannot yet be determined. 
Given the court's public policy holding and its apparent approval of 
the trial court's policy construction analysis, however, it appears 
that those standard liability policies presently in force that afford 
207. Id. at 249, 389 A.2d at 370; see text accompanying notes 193-94 supra. 
208. Id. at 247-48, 389 A.2d at 369. 
209. Id. at 241, 389 A.2d at 365-66. 
210. See text accompanying notes 184-89 supra. 
211. See text accompanying note 169 supra. 
212. 283 Md. at 248, 389 A.2d at 370. 
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coverage to a Maryland insured would be held to afford coverage for 
a punitive assessment for any wrong for which the policy provided 
indemnity for a compensatory damages award. Though it would be 
necessary to analyze the provisions of the individual policy in 
question to determine the scope of its coverage, as a general 
proposition it may be said that commercial policies carrying 
endorsements affording coverage for malicious prosecution, defama-
tion, and false imprisonment would be held to afford indemnity for 
both compensatory and punitive awards.213 While it may not be 
possible to indemnify oneself against any damages assessed for 
direct liability for such torts as assault or battery,214 it does appear 
that the F & D public policy analysis combined with the trial court's 
vicarious liability analysis would allow a business entity to insure 
itself against liability for a punitive award based on an assault or 
battery committed by one of its employees.215 In fact, given the Court 
of Appeals' public policy analysis, it is clear that in the case of a 
punitive award against a business entity based solely upon a theory 
of vicarious liability, the general rule followed in most, if not all, 
jurisdictions that have considered the question216 would pertain, and 
the insured would be allowed to recover both the compensatory and 
punitive damages assessment from his insurer unless specifically 
precluded from doing so by the policy terms. 
Although both the Court of Appeals and the lower court stressed 
that F & D had not specifically excluded punitive damages from the 
terms of its policy coverage,217 it is not clear that the insurer would 
have been allowed by the Maryland state agency regulating 
insurance matters to do so had it made the attempt. No Maryland 
court, at least at the appellate level, had considered the question of 
insurance coverage for punitive damages prior to the instant case, 
and it does not appear that the Attorney General had rendered an 
opinion on the matter. The issue, however, had been addressed at 
least twice by the Maryland Insurance Commission, and both times 
the Commission refused to give approval for the use of a punitive 
damages exclusion endorsement to insurance policies. 
In February, 1975, Northland Insurance Company requested 
permission from the Insurance Commission to issue an endorsement 
to its commercial automobile liability policies that would have stated 
in part, 
213. See First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 
A.2d 359 (1978). 
214. See generally R. LoNG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 1.16 (rev. perm. ed. 
1978). 
215. See First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 241, 
389 A.2d 359, 366 (1978). 
216. See text accompanying notes 74-80 & 122 supra. 
217. See text accompanying notes 109 & 172 supra. 
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It is hereby agreed and understood, in consideration of the 
premium charged, that damages, costs and expenses covered 
under Insuring Agreements ... exclude punitive and/or 
exemplary damages. 
These Insuring Agreements and/or coverage parts are 
limited to compensatory damages resulting strictly from 
liability for the coverage as defined. 218 
In support of its proposed endorsement, the insurance company 
reasoned that most liability policies do not define damages within 
the insuring agreement and generally do not exclude punitive 
damages within the policy terms; consequently most courts construe 
the policy language in such a fashion to hold the insurer responsible 
for payment of all damages, including punitive damages. 219 
Secondly, there was a large disparity among the states' laws and 
regulations concerning insurance coverage for punitive damages, 
and the carrier wished to clarify the distinction between compensato-
ry and punitive awards.220 The carrier stated that its liability rates 
did not contemplate any coverage exposure for punitive awards, that 
allowing indemnity for punitive awards would result in increased 
rates being passed on to the insuring public, and shifting the burden 
of punitive damages from the party responsible for the wrongful act 
to an insurance company did not serve the purposes of such 
damages, which were designed to punish.221 
Disapproving that request, the Insurance Commissioner stated, 
1. No statistical evidence was included in your filing to 
support your request for the amendment of coverage. 
2. Under Florida and Virginia law, "punitive damages" 
are punitory and deterrent. Maryland law, however, is not 
quite as explicit and there is little case law on the subject. 
Compensatory damages are generally defined as such as 
arise from actual and indirect pecuniary loss, mental 
suffering, value of time, actual expenses, and bodily pain 
and suffering. Exemplary, vindictive or punitory damages 
are such as blend together the interests of society and of the 
aggrieved individual, and are not only a recompense to the 
sufferer but also a punishment to the offender and an 
example to the community. 
It would appear that it would be more appropriate to 
consider the nature of the conduct of the wrongdoer rather 
218. Letter from Edwin M. Mitchell, Vice President & Assistant Secretary, Northland 
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than the nature of the damages awarded. These, however, 
are legal issues which are more appropriately the province of 
our judicial system.222 
In 1977, the Insurance Commission again received a request for 
permission to explicitly exclude punitive damages from insurance 
policies. The Insurance Services Office of Maryland requested 
permission to add the following endorsement to a number of types of 
liability policies: 
Regardless of any other provision of this policy, this policy 
does not apply to punitive or exemplary damages. 223 
Again denying permission to add an excluding endorsement, the 
Insurance Commission reiterated much of the rationale of its denial 
of the Northland request, and added that, 
4. In a very broad sense, all awards under a tort liability 
system could be interpreted as containing elements of 
punitive damages. 
5. It is necessary to consider the reasonable expecta-
tions of the insured. While claims may be made, there need 
not be any real basis in fact for the claim and the insured 
has the reasonable expectation of defense.224 
The F & D decision would appear to give the Insurance 
Commission the authority that it had indicated previously it 
believed it lacked to approve either endorsements excluding punitive 
damages coverage or increased premium rates for coverage for such 
damages. 225 It appears, however, that the Commission is going to be 
very reluctant to allow the explicit exclusion of exemplary damages 
coverage in policies issued in this state. 226 
222. Letter from Thomas J. Hatem, Insurance Commissioner, to E. M. Mitchell (May 
12, 1975). 
223. Letter from John A. Beilein, Manager, Insurance Services Office of Maryland, to 
Insurance Commissioner (Sept. 20, 1977). 
224. Letter from Edward J. Birrane, Jr., Insurance Commissioner, to John A. Beilein 
(Oct. 4, 1977). 
225. Judge Smith stated for the majority, 
Insurance companies have not shown a reluctance in the past to write 
into their policies such restrictions as they deem to be in their best 
interest, yet no restriction relative to the issue at bar appears in the 
policy issued by F & D. Surely since the decision in Lazenby 14 years 
ago, if not before, these companies have been congnizant of the fact that 
they might be called upon to pay an award such as that at issue in this 
case. As a consequence, they probably have considered such a possibility 
in establishing rates. 
283 Md. at 242-43, 389 A.2d at 367. 
226. It is not clear at this time, how many of the insurers that issue policies in this 
state will seek either to amend those policies and exclude punitive damages 
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In December, 1978, the Prudential Property and Casualty 
Insurance Company asked the Insurance Division to reconsider its 
previous rejection of a punitive damages exclusion that Prudential 
proposed to add to its umbrella personal liability insurance policy.227 
Pointing out that no court decision or statute precluded the 
contractual right of an insurer to exclude punitive coverage in an 
excess specialty insurance contract by express policy language, 
Prudential's position was that the proposed express exclusion 
is merely to clarify any perceived ambiguity in the policy. 
We do not provide this coverage, and seek only to clarify this 
for our policyholders in order to avoid needless confusion 
and litigation over this issue. The formal exclusion does not 
reduce or change present coverage, and we would continue to 
defend (at the insured's request) punitive damages claims 
made in conjunction with covered (negligence) claims.228 
In support of its request for permission to add the exclusion, 
Prudential set forth the usual arguments that because punitive 
damages are designed for punishment and deterrence rather than 
compensation, no useful purpose is se~ved by allowing a wrongdoer 
to shift his liability to an insurance company, thereby, at the 
expense of other purchasers of insurance, passing along his 
responsibilities for, and the cost of, punitive damages to the citizens 
of the state, the very people to whom he or she is a menace.229 The 
insurer also pointed out that in cases where punitive damages are 
warranted, the financial worth of the wrongdoer generally is 
admissible to determine an amount sufficient to punish the 
wrongdoer and to deter similar misconduct in the future. Therefore, 
if a jury took into account a wrongdoer's financial condition in order 
to award an exemplary verdict sufficient to punish him, the result 
coverage or to raise their premium rates. At least one commentator has 
suggested that competition in the insurance market does not encourage 
insurance companies expressly to exclude punitive damages. See Haskell, The 
Aircraft Manufacturer's Liability For Design and Punitive Damages - The 
Insurance Policy and The Public Policy, 40 JOURNAL OF AIR LAw AND 
COMMERCE 595, 633 (1974). It does not appear that many insurers in Maryland 
had previously sought permission to add exclusionary endorsements to their 
standard policies. At this writing, however, the Insurance Commissioner has 
received several requests for such permission but the author is aware of none 
that have been granted. Several insurers, however, recently have issued policy 
renewals in Maryland that contain endorsements explicitly excluding coverage 
for punitive damages, apparently without previously having obtained the 
Insurance Commissioner's permission to do so. 
227. Letter from Cynthia H. Levy, Law Department, Prudential Property and 
Casualty Insurance Company, to John F. Crouse, Actuary III, Insurance 
Division (Dec. 27, 1978). 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
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would be that an insurance company would pay a higher award for a 
rich wrongdoer than for a poor one.230 
Emphasizing the financial impact upon policy holders of not 
allowing such an exclusion, Prudential stated, 
[I]f the burden of payment is shifted from the wrongdoer to 
the insurer, other purchasers of insurance are ultimately 
punished through higher rates, not the wrongdoer. This 
result would completely abrogate the fundamental purpose 
and public policy of punitive damages. 
[O]ur present Personal Catastrophe policy rates are 
based upon our past experience and normal trend factors. 
Unlike many other carriers, since our policy language was 
never intended to cover punitive damages there is no 
premium loading included in our rates to cover this 
exposure. Nor have we charged a premium or offered a buy-
back for expected punitive damage losses. 
It can be said, however, that if we ultimately are required 
to carry the burden of paying punitive damages rather than 
the wrongdoer, our policyholders will face higher rates. 
[T]he exclusion would favorably affect the majority of 
the citizens of your state by upholding the purpose of 
punitive damages, while avoiding the possible need to raise 
rates in the future because of these claims if they are ever 
deemed to be covered. Only relatively few people may be 
adversely affected by this justifiable approach, those 
committing such acts as to warrant punitive damages. 231 
Disapproving Prudential's request for permission to explicitly 
exclude punitive damages coverage from the policy in question, the 
Insurance Division broadly stated its understanding of the F & D 
court's holding to be that punitive damages are covered by a liability 
insurance policy unless specifically excluded by the language of the 
policy, and that it is not contrary to public policy in Maryland to 
provide insurance for such damages. 232 The crux of the Insurance 
Division's rejection was contained in the following statement: 
The Court goes on to state that it might well be in the public 
interest to include such coverages and that the deterrent 
effect would be spread over a large group. They also point 
230. [d. 
231. [d. 
232. Letter from John F. Crouse, Actuary III, Insurance Division, Department of 
Licensing and Regulation, to Cynthia H. Levy, Law Department, Prudential 
Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Jan. 16, 1979). 
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out that insurance companies can and do control the 
exposure either through rating or underwriting. Large 
corporations and specialist [sic] such as lawyers or agents 
and brokers would realize the consequence of an exclusion-
ary endorsement but the average driver of an automobile or 
a homeowner or a small businessman would not. The Court 
did point out the problems that would face the small 
businessman.233 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based upon the aforegoing review of the Maryland law of 
liability for punitive damages and the insured's right to indemnity 
against an exemplary award, it is suggested that two modifications 
to the law as it presently exists in Maryland are desirable. The first 
recommendation is that the common law as enunciated by the Court 
of Appeals be modified. The second recommendation is that the 
Maryland General Assembly provide statutory guidance to the 
Insurance Division and the insurance companies it regulates. 
A. Punitive Damages in Malicious Prosecution Actions 
When presented with the appropriate case, the Court of Appeals 
should assert its perogative to guide the evolution of the common 
law of the state and follow Judge Levine's recommendation by 
modifying the present law to require a higher degree of offensiveness 
than is presently required as a precondition to punitive recovery in 
malicious prosecution cases. The rules under which sufficient malice 
to support a punitive award may be inferred from a finding that a 
defendant instituted the initial proceeding against a plaintiff based 
on something less than probable cause should be overruled. 
The Court of Appeals has been asked to address that issue once 
already. In the companion case to F & D, First National Bank of St. 
Mary's v. Todd,234 the issue presented upon appeal was whether it 
was against public policy to permit punitive damages awards to be 
predicated solely upon the type of malice that is inferred from a want 
of probable cause for bringing the suit that was the basis for the 
malicious prosecution claim.235 Judge Smith, again writing for the 
court, stated that the court had previously held "that punitive 
damages could be recovered in a malicious prosecution action if a 
jury found 'a want of probable cause, plus malice, but that malice 
might be inferred from a want of probable cause.' "236 
233.ld. 
234. 283 Md. 251, 389 A.2d 371 (1978). 
235. ld. at 252, 389 A.2d at 372. 
236. ld. at 255-56, 389 A.2d at 374. 
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He noted, though, that "our prior holdings may not be the 
majority rule"237 because the authorities generally hold that 
exemplary damages may be awarded in malicious prosecution 
actions when there is proof of actual malice, and that such damages 
may be properly assessed where the defendant's act was willfully 
done, in a wanton and oppressive manner and in conscious 
disregard of his civil obligations.238 The court, however, never 
reached the issue, finding instead that it had not been preserved for 
appellate review.239 
Further, the F & D majority was vitally attuned to the inherit 
difficulties presented by the common law regarding malicious 
prosecution in Maryland. Considerable effort was spent by the 
majority pointing out the likelihood of a basically well-meaning 
businessman finding himself liable for both compensatory and 
punitive damages in a malicious prosecution action after he had 
instituted the initial action for what he believed to be good reason, to 
protect his business interests. 
In light of the relative ease with which punitive damages may be 
recovered against a defendant in a malicious prosecution action even 
if his conduct, objectively viewed, is not extreme or outrageous, it is 
suggested that Judge Levine's theory of ensuring that punitive _ 
damages be assessed in all tort actio~s according to a uniform 
standard of culpability, thereby furthering the punishment and 
deterrence rationale behind exemplary awards, should become the 
law of this state. 
B. Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages 
The F & D majority placed major emphasis upon the fact that 
the General Assembly has made no pronouncements on the subject 
of insurance coverage for punitive damages and therefore the court 
had received no guidance from the normal policy-declaring depart-
ment of the government to assist in its resolution of the issue 
presented.240 Finding "not the slightest suggestion of a 'constitution-
al or statutory provision' from which a public policy against 
payment [by an insurer of a punitive award against its insured] is 
deducible," the court made its own determination that" 'the common 
sense of the entire community would [not] pronounce it' against 
public policy for the Bank's insurance company to pay the judgment 
for exemplary damages assessed against the Bank."241 
237. Id. at 256, 389 A.2d at 374. 
238. Id. The court quoted from 52 AM. JUR.2d Malicious Prosecution § 94 (1970) and 
cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). 
239. 283 Md. at 257, 389 A.2d at 374. 
240. Id. at 239, 243, 389 A.2d at 365, 367. 
241. Id. at 243, 389 A.2d at 367. 
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In light of those pronouncements by the Court of Appeals and 
the Insurance Division's apparent hesitation to assert its authority 
to permit exclusionary endorsements without more explicit direc-
tions from the judiciary, the need for legislative guidance is clear. It 
is therefore recommended that at its earliest opportunity, the 
General Assembly forbid protection by insurance indemnity against 
exemplary awards.242 It is suggested that despite the F & D court's 
concern for the potential plight of the small businessman facing a 
malicious prosecution award, the "common sense of the entire 
community" as reflected in its microcosm, the jury, would be 
surprised and offended if the jurors were instructed that they could 
award damages for the purpose of punishing the defendant and 
deterring other potential wrongdoers, yet were also aware that the 
sum which they assessed as a punishment and a deterrent would 
come not from the pockets of the defendant but from the coffers of an 
insurance carrier.243 If the purpose of punitive damages is to punish 
and deter, that purpose is adequately fulfilled only if the wrongdoer 
suffers the immediate and personal consequence of his wrongdoing 
without the ability to dissipate the immediate financial impact of his 
punishment by shifting that impact away from himself or by 
deferring it to a later point in time when his rates are increased or 
his insurance is not renewed. Further, it is suggested that if 
insurance carriers are required to provide coverage for punitive 
awards, it is likely that many policy holders will be faced with 
increased premium rates as the risk of punitive awards is spread 
beyond those guilty of extreme and outrageous conduct to the 
insurance purchasing population as a whole. Even if insurance 
carriers are allowed the option of providing or refusing punitive 
assessment coverage, it seems probable that inequities will result. 
Business entities and wealthy individuals could more readily afford 
to pay increased premiums to obtain optional coverage for potential 
punitive liabilities than could less well-to-do persons. Such a 
situation therefore results in the anomaly of the wealthy tort-feasor 
virtually escaping financial punishment for his wrongs while the 
poorer one bears the full impact of punitive liability for his 
wrongdoing. The "common sense of the entire community" should be 
offended by such a result. 
242. On February 23, 1979, S. 1089 was introduced in the Senate of Maryland. The 
declared purpose of the bill was to render "the payment of punitive damages by 
insurance companies ... against public policy." The Legislature, however, 
rejected the bill. 
243. In light of current law regarding the mention of insurance before a jury, jurors 
could not actually be told that the defendant had insurance coverage for any of 
the wrongs alleged. See, e.g., Snowwhite v. State, Use of Tennant, 243 Md. 291, 
221 A.2d 342 (1966). 
